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PROPHYLACTIC REDISTRICTING? CONGRESS’S SECTION 5
POWER AND THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHT TO
VOTE
MICHAEL T. MORLEY*
ABSTRACT
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) has been an important mechanism
for increasing participation by racial minorities in the electoral sys-
tem. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has demonstrated
its willingness to reconsider the VRA’s constitutionality. Due to the
broad prophylactic scope of section 2 of the VRA, two main develop-
ments pose risks to its continued validity. 
First, the Supreme Court narrowed Congress’s enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in City of Boerne v.
Flores, and is likely to interpret Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment similarly. Section 2 of the VRA features many key charac-
teristics of statutes that the Court has held exceeded Congress’s
Enforcement Clause authority. The Court may nevertheless preserve
section 2 by applying it in light of traditional remedial principles
governing prophylactic injunctive relief. Section 2 would fit comfort-
ably within Congress’s authority if it were interpreted as prophylacti-
cally prohibiting constitutionally valid state laws, legislative maps,
or other election-related measures only when those principles
establish it is reasonably necessary to prevent violations of Four-
teenth or Fifteenth Amendment rights. 
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Second, ongoing evolution in equal protection jurisprudence calls
into question measures such as section 2 of the VRA that provide
prophylactic protection for certain groups. The Court has historically
adopted a “pro-voting” conception of equal protection under which
laws protecting voting rights only for certain people were generally
upheld under rational basis scrutiny. Bush v. Gore laid the founda-
tion for a “pro-equality” approach emphasizing that, because voting
is a fundamental right, any distinctions among people concerning the
right to vote are subject to strict scrutiny and likely invalid. The
ongoing shift from a “pro-voting” to “pro-equality” equal protection
norm reflects the Court’s skepticism of legislative control over the
electoral process, as well as its reformation of voting rights from a
purely political issue into a constitutional one. A “pro-equality” con-
ception of equal protection enhances courts’ power to protect voting
rights while reducing the ability of Congress and legislatures to do
so.
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INTRODUCTION
The generally accepted purpose of a democratic election is to
ascertain “the will of the people,” yet there often is not any such
determinate will independent of the rules regulating the electoral
process.1 Consequently, the rules governing an election frequently
play a tremendous role in shaping its outcome. For example, Ar-
row’s Paradox arises when people must make a series of binary
choices from among various options and their collective preferences
are cyclical rather than transitive.2 In such cases, there is no single,
definitive “will of the people” for an election to ascertain;3 the elec-
torate’s ultimate decision will depend on the order in which voters
are invited to choose between different pairs of options.4
The will of the people in a presidential election can look very
different depending on whether it is measured by popular vote or
the Electoral College.5 Similarly, determining the will of the people
in legislative elections depends on whether the elections are
conducted statewide or by district;6 in elections conducted on a
1. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 1-2 (5th ed. 2016).
2. Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Per-
spectives of a “Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1551-52 (1993).
3. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 873, 902 (1987); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2121, 2135-39 (1990).
4. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (2d ed. 1963). Arrow’s
Paradox helps explain why a state’s transition from a traditional primary system to a top-two
system can affect which candidates ultimately win general elections. Cf. Richard H. Pildes,
Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 273, 301-02 (2011) (predicting likely consequences of California’s adoption of
a “top-two” primary system).
5. See Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: An Introduction and Over-
view, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 977, 982-84 (2016) (discussing elections in which the candidate
who won the popular vote did not become President). Most recently, President Donald J.
Trump beat Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election despite the fact that she received
nearly three million more votes nationwide. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, OFFICIAL 2016 PRESI-
DENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 1, 2, 6 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/
2016presgeresults.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F8E-HVTT].
6. Originally, states were free to award seats in the U.S. House of Representatives
through at-large statewide elections. In 1842, Congress enacted a statute, pursuant to its
authority under the Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, requiring that each House
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district-by-district basis, the apparent will of the people depends on
where district boundaries are drawn.7 Voters’ apparent preferences
and desires may even be influenced by the phrasing of a question in
a referendum or the order in which candidates are listed on a bal-
lot.8
The Voting Rights Act (VRA)9 is one of the most important
constraints on the ability of states and localities to set the rules
governing the electoral process.10 By limiting states’ power to mani-
pulate their policies to hinder minority voting, the VRA has played
a major role in structuring the electoral process at all levels and
led to dramatically increased participation rates for African Amer-
icans.11 Most notably, it has been interpreted to require states to
create majority-minority legislative districts to ensure that minority
voters may elect the candidates of their choice.12 In some cases,
race be conducted within its own contiguous single-member district. Act of June 25, 1842,
ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2012)).
7. The importance of district lines to electoral outcomes is reflected in persistent efforts
to persuade the Supreme Court to recognize a cause of action for political gerrymandering.
See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 864 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued,
No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017); cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (holding that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable due to a lack of
judicially manageable standards).
8. See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai, Estimating Causal Effects of Ballot Order from
a Randomized Natural Experiment: The California Alphabet Lottery, 1978-2002, 72 PUB.
OPINION Q. 216, 218 (2008). Some courts have struck down laws requiring incumbents to be
listed first on ballots or that candidates’ names be printed in alphabetical order on the
grounds that they systematically advantaged certain candidates. See, e.g., Gould v. Grubb,
536 P.2d 1337, 1338, 1346 (Cal. 1975); cf. Graves v. McElderry, 946 F. Supp. 1569, 1581-82
(W.D. Okla. 1996) (striking down statute requiring that the Democratic candidate always be
listed first). “Several jurisdictions perform ... lotteries to determine ballot order. Some states
and localities take the additional step of rotating candidate names across election districts ....
In still other states, far more pernicious practices determine the order.” Laura Miller, Note,
Election by Lottery: Ballot Order, Equal Protection, and the Irrational Voter, 13 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 373, 374-75 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
9. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301-10314, 10501-10508, 10701-10702 (Supp. III 2016)). 
10. The VRA applies to both states and their political subdivisions. E.g., 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(a) (Supp. III 2016); cf. id. § 10304(a) (imposing preclearance restrictions on certain
states and political subdivisions). For brevity, this Article will use the term “states” to refer
collectively to all such entities. 
11. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 264 (2000); see also Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625-26
(2013). 
12. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.16 (1986) (noting that, under certain
circumstances, section 2 of the VRA requires a “minority group that is sufficiently large and
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states have been required to disaggregate multimember districts for
state and local legislative bodies into single-member districts to
compel the creation of predominantly minority districts.13 In recent
years, section 2 of the VRA has been used as the basis for striking
down a wide array of electoral reforms, including voter identification
requirements,14 reductions in early voting periods,15 and attempts
to eliminate same-day voter registration.16 Some courts have gone
even further, invoking section 2 to invalidate measures such as the
elimination of straight-ticket voting.17
The VRA has long been regarded as a “super-statute,”18 part of
the firmament of American law virtually immune from challenge.19
As the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelby County v. Holder 20 and
dissenting opinions in other recent VRA cases21 vividly demonstrate,
compact” to be preserved within its own “single-member district”). 
13. See id. at 80 (affirming the lower court’s finding “that use of a multimember electoral
structure has caused black voters in the districts ... to have less opportunity than white voters
to elect representatives of their choice”). 
14. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 225, 272 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding
Texas’s voter identification law violated section 2 of the VRA due to its effects), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 612 (2017), on remand, 249 F. Supp. 3d 868, 875-76 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding
Texas’s voter identification law also violated section 2 of the VRA due to its purportedly
discriminatory intent), stay granted by 870 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2017); N.C. State Conference
of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 235-39 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399
(2017).
15. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 236. 
16. See id. at 237. 
17. Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 209 F. Supp. 3d 935, 949-54 (E.D.
Mich. 2016), stay denied, 833 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2016).
18. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1216 (2001) (defining a “super-statute” as a law that imposes “a new normative or insti-
tutional framework for state policy,” becomes integrated into the culture, and has a “broad
effect on the law” beyond its “four corners”). 
19. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 117-18 (2010) (identifying the VRA as a “classic example of a
superstatute”); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Rethinking Proxies for Disadvantage in Higher
Education: A First Generation Students’ Project, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 433, 437 (explaining
that the VRA is “rightly ... understood as [a] ‘superstatute[ ]’”). 
20. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625-26 (2013) (rejecting the statutory
formula for identifying the jurisdictions to which the preclearance requirements of section 5
of the VRA apply); see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder, 557
U.S. 193, 202 (2009).
21. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. State Va. Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 807 (2017)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Court’s
refusal “to decide whether § 5 [of the VRA] is constitutional, despite having twice taken cases
to decide that question”).
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however, we are no longer in an “age of maintenance” concerning
the VRA.22 To the contrary, the Court has demonstrated its will-
ingness to reconsider both the VRA’s scope and constitutional legit-
imacy.23 Professors Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
cogently explain that, at least at the Supreme Court, “the consensus
about racial discrimination that supported the VRA has dissolved.”24
With the VRA’s preclearance requirements held in abeyance under
Shelby County,25 section 2 of the VRA—which prohibits states from
adopting rules or engaging in actions that prevent racial minorities
from electing candidates of their choice26—assumes even greater
importance.
In light of the skepticism toward the VRA the Supreme Court has
manifested in recent years,27 two major developments pose sub-
stantial threats to what remains of the statute. To help preserve
this key protection for voting rights for all Americans, voting rights
advocates must structure their arguments concerning the Act’s
proper interpretation and scope to avoid or minimize such concerns.
The VRA’s opponents, in contrast, are likely to use these develop-
ments as pressure points around which to craft future challenges.
First, the Supreme Court’s 1996 ruling in City of Boerne v. Flores
marks a dramatic shift in the Court’s understanding of the scope of
congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.28 Shortly after the VRA’s enactment, in Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, the Supreme Court easily affirmed that the statute was a valid
exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 and did not violate
equal protection restrictions.29 The Court analogized Section 5 to the
Necessary and Proper Clause,30 holding it grants Congress sweeping
22. Cf. Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 903, 984 (2008).
23. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in
Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1391 (2015) (“Shelby County
mark[ed] the death of the VRA as a superstatute.”). 
24. Id. at 1439. 
25. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2625-26.
26. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as a-
mended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016)). 
27. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 23, at 1420-21. 
28. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
29. 384 U.S. 641, 650-52 (1966).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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authority to enact any laws it deems “appropriate” to enforce
constitutional rights, including voting rights.31 The Court elsewhere
held32 that Congress has similarly broad authority under Section 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment,33 which permits Congress to enforce
that Amendment’s prohibition against intentional racial discrimina-
tion concerning voting rights.34
Under the Court’s original interpretation of these enforcement
clauses, Congress could not only prevent states from violating the
Constitution, but also enact purely prophylactic measures banning
constitutionally valid state actions that Congress believed might
lead to, or be a cover for, a potential constitutional violation.35 When
Congress acts under these provisions, it may even be able to au-
thorize states to enact race-conscious measures that would other-
wise be suspect.36
Boerne, in contrast, adopted a much narrower conception of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that a law enact-
ed pursuant to that provision must be “congruent and proportion-
al[ ]” to actual constitutional violations that can be established in an
evidentiary record.37 Boerne raises questions as to whether: Katz-
enbach remains good law; Boerne’s interpretation of Section 5 ap-
31. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 650-51, 651 n.10 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
345-46 (1879)).
32. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 174-77 (1980) (analogizing the
Fifteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause to the Necessary and Proper Clause), abrogated
by Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 308, 324, 326 (1966).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.”).
34. Id. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (“[A]ction by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amend-
ment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”).
35. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 (“Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); South Caro-
lina, 383 U.S. at 327 (rejecting the argument that “Congress may appropriately do no more”
under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment “than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment in general terms”). 
36. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[C]on-
siderations of race that would doom a redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment
or § 2 [of the Voting Rights Act] seem to be what save it under § 5 [of the Voting Rights Act].”). 
37. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
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plies equally to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment and other
voting rights amendments’ enforcement clauses;38 and the VRA—
either as currently interpreted39 or under reasonable alternate
interpretations—falls within this more limited conception of con-
gressional authority.40
Boerne threatens the VRA’s validity because Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment
are the constitutional cornerstones of congressional voting rights
enforcement. They are the only provisions even potentially broad
enough to support the VRA. Congress has virtually plenary au-
thority41 to regulate congressional42 and presidential43 elections.
Apart from its power to induce states to voluntarily comply with
federal standards by offering grants under the Spending Clause,44
however, Congress’s only authority to regulate elections at all lev-
els of government (including state and local races) comes from Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,45 Section 2 of the Fifteenth
38. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636 n.2 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing); infra notes 45-47 (identifying enforcement clauses of the Constitution’s voting rights
amendments).
39. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (establishing a three-prong test
for section 2 violations that effectively prohibits constitutionally permissible state voting laws
that would have racially disparate impacts). 
40. See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2341, 2346-47 (2003) (recognizing the serious potential threat Boerne poses to section 2 of
the VRA). 
41. As with all congressional powers, this authority may not be used to violate
constitutional rights. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001). Moreover, Congress may
not attempt “to dictate electoral outcomes [or] to favor or disfavor a class of candidates.” Id.
(quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833-34 (1995)). Congress is also
forbidden from establishing qualifications for running or voting for Congress. See Michael T.
Morley, Dismantling the Unitary Electoral System? Uncooperative Federalism in State and
Local Elections, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 106 (2017).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1932).
43. The Supreme Court has held that, although no constitutional provision expressly
grants Congress power to regulate presidential elections, its authority over them is as broad
as its power over congressional elections. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545
(1934). See generally Morley, supra note 41, at 109 (discussing the scope of Congress’s
constitutional authority over various types of elections).
44. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
580 (2012) (plurality opinion) (explaining the limits of Spending Clause authority).
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
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Amendment,46 and other complementary voting rights enforcement
provisions.47 By narrowing the scope of Section 5, Boerne partly
eroded the VRA’s constitutional foundation.
Second, the judiciary’s interpretation of the equal protection right
to vote appears to be in the midst of an even more fundamental
evolution. Traditionally, the Supreme Court adopted a “pro-voting”
interpretation of equal protection. The Court would generally up-
hold measures that expanded the franchise or made it easier for
certain segments of the electorate to vote, even though they did not
apply to other, similarly situated individuals.48 It construed the
Constitution to facilitate efforts to expand voting rights, even on a
piecemeal basis.
Later precedents, and circuit court cases building on them, adopt
more of a “pro-equality” approach. A measure is no longer deemed
constitutional simply because it selectively expands the franchise,
makes it easier for some people to vote, or extends special protec-
tions to certain populations. Rather, modern equal protection doc-
trine appears to require that voting-related rights generally be
conferred upon everyone (or all similarly situated people) or no
one.49
This “new” equal protection right to vote, arising from the Court’s
concept of voting as a fundamental right,50 seems more in accord
with the principles underlying the Equal Protection Clause than
the pro-voting interpretation. One serious challenge of the pro-
equality interpretation, however, is that measures such as section
2 of the VRA, which offer certain groups special protection even
from constitutionally valid state laws that disadvantage them,
become much harder to justify. This Article is among the first to
recognize this “new” equal protection right to vote and consider its
impact on the VRA, as well as congressional power under Section 5
46. Id. amend. XV, § 2. 
47. See id. amend. XIX, § 2 (empowering Congress to enforce the constitutional prohibi-
tion on sex discrimination in voting); id. amend. XXVI, § 2 (empowering Congress to enforce
the constitutional prohibition on age-based discrimination in voting, for people who are at
least eighteen years old); see also id. amend. XXIV, § 2 (empowering Congress to enforce the
constitutional prohibition on poll taxes in federal elections).
48. See infra Part III.B.
49. See infra Part III.C.
50. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam); see also infra Part III.C.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment.
Part I begins by setting forth various conceptions of “the right to
vote” under the Constitution and federal law. It contends that the
phrase can be understood in at least five different senses, as refer-
ring to either: (1) the right to be recognized as an eligible voter; (2)
the right of an eligible voter to cast a ballot without undue burden;
(3) the right of an eligible voter who casts a ballot to have it counted
and assigned weight equal to other people’s votes; (4) the claimed
right of voters to be assigned to districts drawn according to spec-
ified criteria (whether those criteria are traditional redistricting
principles, race-based considerations to enhance minority voting
strength, partisan affiliation, or other such factors); and (5) the right
of voters to not have their ballots be diluted or effectively nullified
by fraudulent votes, improperly cast votes, or votes from ineligible
people. Distinguishing among these competing senses of the phrase
is critical to understanding the evolution of the Court’s equal pro-
tection jurisprudence and, more generally, the contexts in which the
Court’s conservative turn poses the most substantial risk to section
2 of the VRA.
The remainder of this Article turns to the impending threats to
the VRA. Part II explores the implications of, and potential re-
sponses to, the Court’s narrowing of Congress’s enforcement author-
ity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It recommends
that courts address the uncertainty introduced by Boerne by inter-
preting and applying section 2 of the VRA in light of traditional
remedial principles applied in the context of injunctions. To the
extent section 2 is a prophylactic measure that bars states from
enacting laws or adopting policies that are not actually uncon-
stitutional, Supreme Court doctrine governing injunctions provides
an objective, well-established, principled basis for determining the
proper scope of such prophylactic relief. Applying this body of re-
medial law to determine the circumstances under which, as a pro-
phylactic measure, section 2 of VRA may be validly applied may
help it survive scrutiny under Boerne.
Part III examines the judiciary’s continuing shift from a pro-
voting to a pro-equality interpretation of equal protection. Histori-
cally, the Court has allowed Congress to confer special protection
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for certain groups’ voting rights beyond what the Constitution man-
dates to more fully incorporate people into the political process.
“Pro-equality” equal protection case law that focuses on voting as a
fundamental right, however, reduces Congress’s ability to create
special prophylactic protections for certain groups’ voting rights,
leaving primary responsibility for enforcing them to the courts. The
Article then briefly concludes.
I. UNPACKING THE “RIGHT TO VOTE”
To understand the various contexts in which voter protection
laws such as section 2 of the VRA may be applied, it is helpful to re-
cognize that the phrase “right to vote” is ambiguous, susceptible to
at least five different meanings. First, the “right to vote” can refer
to a person’s right to be recognized as an eligible voter. The U.S.
Constitution’s Voter Qualifications Clauses, for example, grant a
person entitled to vote for the most populous house of her state
legislature the right to vote for the U.S. House of Representatives51
and U.S. Senate,52 as well. This may be called “Voter Eligibility
Rights”: the constitutional right to vote restricts a state’s ability to
determine the composition of its electorate.53
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment substantially penalized
states for refusing to allow adult citizens to vote,54 but formally left
them free to ultimately decide whether to extend the franchise.55
Even after the enactment of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amend-
ments, states retained most of their traditional broad discretion to
determine voter eligibility for themselves.56 As late as 1959, the
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
52. Id. amend. XVII, § 1. 
53. Most voting rights amendments confer only a limited Voter Eligibility Right; while
states are prohibited from denying a person the right to vote based on race, gender, or age—
for those who are at least eighteen years old—those amendments do not affirmatively require
the state to extend voting rights to anyone. See, e.g., infra notes 221-23 and accompanying
text.
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
55. Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 318-22. Congress has never imple-
mented Section 2’s penalty—reduction in representation in the U.S. House of Representatives
and, by extension, the Electoral College—against states that abridged or denied the right to
vote. Id. at 327.
56. See infra Part III.A.
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Supreme Court affirmed states’ authority to impose voter qualifi-
cations and shape their electorates.57
During the Civil Rights Era, the Supreme Court dramatically
expanded Voter Eligibility Rights,58 concomitantly reducing states’
discretion to limit the franchise. Most modern disputes concerning
Voter Eligibility Rights center around felon disenfranchisement59
(which the Constitution expressly permits)60 and the voting rights
of U.S. citizens living in the District of Columbia,61 U.S. territories
and possessions,62 and foreign nations.63
Second, the right to vote may refer to the right of an eligible voter
to be permitted to cast a ballot without being subject to discrimi-
natory or unduly burdensome procedures. This may be called “Voter
Participation Rights”: the right to vote restricts a state’s power to
regulate the electoral process. Voter Participation Rights are
57. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (holding that
a state may adopt “standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot”). 
58. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (“To introduce wealth or
payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or
irrelevant factor.”). 
59. See, e.g., Malnes v. Arizona, No. 16-16208, 2017 WL 2829128, at *1 (9th Cir. June 30,
2017) (holding that the plaintiff “failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that Arizona’s
felon disenfranchisement statute reflects racial animus or discrimination”); Johnson v. Gov.
of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (upholding constitutionality of Florida’s
felon disenfranchisement provision).
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54
(1974). 
61. See, e.g., Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2000) (three-judge court)
(“[C]onstitutional text, history, and judicial precedent bar us from accepting plaintiffs’ con-
tention that the District of Columbia may be considered a state for purposes of congressional
representation under Article I.”), aff’d, 531 U.S. 941 (2000) (order); Mark S. Scarberry, His-
torical Considerations and Congressional Representation for the District of Columbia: Con-
stitutionality of the D.C. House Voting Rights Bill in Light of Section Two of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the History of the Creation of the District, 60 ALA. L. REV. 783, 795 (2009)
(“The failure of the original text of the Constitution to provide for congressional represen-
tation for the District was not the result of inadvertence.”). 
62. See, e.g., Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause does not guarantee U.S. citizens who moved to U.S. territories the right to
vote); Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 218 F. Supp. 3d 643, 645 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding
that Illinois was not constitutionally required to allow former residents who moved to Guam,
Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands to continue voting even though it permits former res-
idents who move to the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, or a foreign country to
continue voting), aff’d in part and vacated in part sub nom. Sequoia v. United States, 880 F.3d
384 (7th Cir. 2018).
63. See Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100
Stat. 924 (1986) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20311 (Supp. III 2016)).
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generally governed by the Anderson-Burdick standard, which de-
rives its name from the Supreme Court cases which established it.64
Under this test, 
a court begins by determining whether the challenged election
law imposes “severe restrictions” on the right to vote, in which
case the law is subject to strict scrutiny and generally invali-
dated. If the law does not impose such a burden—and most
election laws do not—the court then balances the goals the law
seeks to further against the resulting burden on constitutional
rights.65
Voter Participation Rights tend to be the focus of disputes concern-
ing voter registration requirements,66 voter identification laws, re-
ductions in early voting periods, and other changes to regulations
governing electoral procedures.67
Third, the right to vote may refer to the right of a voter to have
his ballot be counted and accorded the same weight as those of other
voters in the election. This may be called “Voter Equality Rights”:
the right to vote restricts a state’s power to ignore or devalue prop-
erly cast ballots,68 such as by crafting legislative districts of dispa-
rate population sizes.69 Voter Equality Rights apply both before an
64. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 788 & n.9 (1983). 
65. See Morley, supra note 55, at 281 (footnotes omitted). Elsewhere, I have argued that
the Anderson-Burdick test is too ad hoc and subjective and suggested a more objective,
constitutionally rooted alternative. See id. at 286, 297-98 (arguing that Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, construed in light of remedial equilibration theory, offers more
concrete guidance for identifying violations of Voter Participation Rights).
66. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of the United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 4, 9-10
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20508(b)(1),
barred the Executive Director of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission from granting the
Kansas Secretary of State’s request to change the state-specific instructions accompanying
the federal voter registration form to require people seeking to register in Kansas to provide
proof of U.S. citizenship). 
67. See supra notes 14-16 (collecting cases).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941) (“Obviously included
within the right to choose, secured by the Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within
a state to cast their ballots and have them counted at Congressional elections.”); United
States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (“[T]he right to have one’s vote counted is as open
to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in a box.”). 
69. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1983) (discussing “[t]he principle
of population equality for congressional districts”).
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election, in the drawing of legislative and congressional district
lines, as well as during the ballot-counting process. This aspect of
the right to vote rests on the time-honored “one-person, one-vote”
principle.70 Voter Equality Rights require that congressional dis-
tricts within a state contain populations as equal as possible,71 while
the populations of state legislative districts generally may diverge
by no more than 10 percent.72
Fourth, relatedly, the right to vote may refer to the (frequently
contested) right of a voter to have districts be drawn according to
certain criteria, whether those standards are “traditional race-
neutral districting principles,”73 party affiliation,74 preservation of
cohesive racial voting blocs,75 or other such concerns. This may be
called “Voter Associational Rights”: to the extent these rights are
recognized, they restrict a state’s power to draw district boundaries,
even among districts of equal populations.76
Voter Associational Rights are among the most contested aspects
of the right to vote, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s
70. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political equality from
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”);
see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by
a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”). 
71. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732-33 (“[W]e have required that absolute population equality
be the paramount objective of apportionment only in the case of congressional districts.”);
accord Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969). 
72. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (“[A]t-
tacks on deviations under 10% will succeed only rarely, in unusual cases.”); Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 579. The Supreme Court arguably diminished the practical protection afforded by
Voter Equality Rights by holding that states may draw state legislative districts based on
total population, rather than the number of people eligible to vote or become voters within
each district. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1126-27 (2016) (“[I]t is plainly permissi-
ble for jurisdictions to measure equalization by the total population of state and local legisla-
tive districts.”). Under Evenwel, a voter living in a district disproportionately populated by
active voters will be able to exercise relatively less control over an election’s outcome than a
voter living in another district within the state populated by a large number of legal or
undocumented immigrants who are ineligible to vote.
73. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
74. See supra note 7. 
75. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.16 (1986). 
76. Cf. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1271 (2015) (“[T]he
requirement that districts have approximately equal populations is a background rule against
which redistricting takes place,” rather than a “factor to be treated like other nonracial
factors.”). 
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repeated insistence that the Constitution does not guarantee pro-
portional representation of political, racial, or other social groups.77
The Court is presently considering whether Voter Associational
Rights prohibit states from engaging in political gerrymandering.78
The Court has already established, however, that the Constitution’s
prohibition on intentional racial discrimination generally precludes
a state from drawing congressional or legislative districts based
primarily on racial considerations,79 regardless of whether those
districts are unusually shaped or instead accord with traditional
redistricting principles.80
Finally, the Court has recognized that an eligible voter who has
validly cast a ballot has the fundamental right to have the ballot be
given full weight and effect without being nullified or diluted by
fraudulent votes, improperly cast votes, or votes cast by ineligible
voters.81 Call this the “Defensive Right to Vote”: a state is constitu-
tionally required to assure the integrity of its elections by protect-
ing valid votes against fraudulent or otherwise invalid ballots.82
77. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 79 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Court
has sternly set its face against the claim, however phrased, that the Constitution somehow
guarantees proportional representation.” (emphasis added)); see also LULAC v. Perry, 548
U.S. 399, 419 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“[T]here is no constitutional requirement of propor-
tional representation.”); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975) (holding that a constitu-
tional violation does not arise from “a simple disproportionality between the voting potential
and the legislative seats won by a racial or political group”).
78. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 864 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court),
argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
79. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff ’s burden is to show ...
that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a signifi-
cant number of voters within or without a particular district.”). Such claims of racial discrim-
ination in redistricting were first recognized by Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993). 
80. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 799 (2017) (holding that
a voter may “establish racial predominance in the absence of an actual conflict [with
traditional redistricting criteria] by presenting direct evidence of the legislative purpose and
intent”). 
81. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226 (1974) (holding that a person has the
constitutional right to have his or her vote be “given full value and effect, without being
diluted or distorted by the casting of fraudulent [or otherwise ineligible] ballots”); see also
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (holding that a person’s right to vote is “denied by
a debasement or dilution of the weight of [his or her] vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962)
(holding that the right to vote is violated by “dilution” of people’s votes through means such
as the “stuffing of the ballot box”).
82. See Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented
Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. &
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This concept is an important complement to other aspects of the
right to vote, confirming that states have a constitutionally signif-
icant interest in the enforcement of reasonable voting restrictions,
rather than always erring on the side of allowing people to vote
despite doubts about their eligibility or the validity of their ballots.
Election law must constantly strive to strike a balance between
ensuring that all eligible voters are given an opportunity to cast
their ballots, while simultaneously preventing legitimately cast
votes from being diluted, nullified, or effectively cancelled out.
The Defensive Right to Vote is the hardest to litigate from a con-
stitutional perspective because the threat of invalid votes usually
presents a generalized grievance that does not inflict a particular-
ized injury on any particular voter.83 Voters sometimes assert the
Defensive Right to Vote as a basis for intervening in litigation to
defend the validity of election-related regulations,84 particularly
when a substantial risk exists that the state or locality will not do
so vigorously or effectively. Certain statutes, such as the National
Voter Registration Act (NVRA), also create causes of action that
allow private plaintiffs to compel states to adequately maintain
their voter registration lists to reduce the possibility of fraudulent
or improper voting.85
PUB. POL’Y 487, 528 (2016); Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State
Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 189, 192-93 (2014) [hereinafter Morley, Rethinking].
83. See, e.g., Landes v. Tartaglione, No. Civ. A.04-CV-3164, 2004 WL 2397292, at *2-3
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2004) (dismissing a challenge to the use of absentee ballots in an election
on the ground they facilitate fraud under the generalized grievance doctrine), aff’d, 153 F.
App’x 131 (3d Cir. 2005); cf. Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 437-38, 442 (2007) (per curiam)
(rejecting a claim that a state constitutional provision prohibiting the state legislature from
redrawing congressional districts more often than once every decade violated the Elections
Clause under the generalized grievance doctrine). 
84. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d
302, 305-06 (Wis. 2014) (upholding a voter identification statute that voters intervened to help
defend). The author represented the intervenor voters in this case.
85. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20507(a)(4), (b)(1), 20510(b) (Supp. III 2016). The Supreme Court has held
that the Help America Vote Act’s list maintenance requirements, 52 U.S.C. § 21083, in con-
trast, are unenforceable by private plaintiffs. See Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 555 U.S.
5, 6 (2008) (per curiam). The U.S. Department of Justice, particularly under Republican ad-
ministrations, has entered into consent decrees with some states to ensure they comply with
those provisions. See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. Maine, No. 06-86-B-W (D. Me.
Aug. 1, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/crt/united-states-district-court-district-maine-bangor-
division [https://perma.cc/UYB3-BGQB]; Consent Decree, United States v. Indiana, No. 1:06-
cv-1000-RLY-TAB (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/crt/consent-decree-and-
order [https://perma.cc/SX5H-P7P6]. 
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Different conceptions of the right to vote may come into conflict
with each other. For example, claims for greater Voter Participation
Rights by eliminating proof-of-citizenship or identification require-
ments for voting might undermine the Defensive Right to Vote by
increasing the possibility of invalid votes.86 Similarly, different
claimed Voter Associational Rights may support the establishment
of conflicting sets of congressional or legislative district boundaries,
depending on the particular criteria each proposed redistricting plan
emphasizes.
The VRA prohibits states from denying or abridging the right to
vote based on race.87 Courts have recognized that section 2 of the
VRA gives rise to both “vote denial” and “vote dilution” claims.88 The
VRA’s prohibition on discriminatory vote denial protects Voter Eli-
gibility Rights (that is, the right to be recognized as an eligible vot-
er) and Voter Participation Rights (that is, the right to cast a ballot
without being subject to unduly burdensome procedures). Its ban
on discriminatory vote dilution, in contrast, protects Voter Equality
Rights (that is, the right to have one’s vote be counted and accorded
weight equal to other people’s votes) and at least some forms of
Voter Associational Rights (that is, rights concerning the composi-
tion of legislative districts).
Insofar as the VRA protects Voter Eligibility Rights and Voter
Equality Rights, it is largely uncontroversial. States have generally
extended the franchise, including in state and local races, to adult
citizens who satisfy minimal residency requirements. In this re-
spect, the VRA has been unabashedly successful: states no longer
attempt to impose qualifications such as literacy tests or property
requirements for being recognized as an eligible voter. The primary
86. See Morley, supra note 41, at 123-24. 
87. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (Supp. III 2016)). The VRA has also been amended to protect
against language-based discrimination in voting as well. See Voting Rights Amendment Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, secs. 203, 206-207, 301, 89 Stat. 400, 401-03 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. § 10503 (Supp. III 2016)).
88. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) (“The right to vote can be affected by a
dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.” (emphasis
and alteration omitted) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969)));
Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act,
57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691 (2006); see, e.g., Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366,
378-79 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), stay granted by 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016); League of Women
Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 238-41 (4th Cir. 2014).
2018] PROPHYLACTIC REDISTRICTING? 2071
remaining disputes over Voter Eligibility Rights generally tend to
concern felon disenfranchisement laws, which courts have held are
valid under the VRA,89 and whether particular voters such as college
students or the homeless satisfy state residency requirements.90
Thus, while the VRA imposes greater limits on states’ power to im-
pose voter qualifications than the Constitution itself,91 serious dis-
putes concerning such applications of the statute are unlikely to
arise.
Courts are similarly unlikely to question the VRA’s applicability
to Voter Equality Rights simply because the law seldom applies in
such cases. Claims concerning Voter Equality Rights are typically
brought directly under the Constitution on the ground that popula-
tion disparities among congressional or legislative districts are too
large.92 While the presence of a racially discriminatory intent or
disparate impact bolsters such claims, their gravamen remains the
numerical disparities among different districts. Consequently, the
VRA typically adds little in such cases.
 The Supreme Court’s willingness to reassess the VRA’s constitu-
tionality makes the statute most potentially vulnerable in two
critical contexts: vote denial claims enforcing Voter Participation
Rights, and vote dilution claims asserting Voter Associational
Rights. In cases involving Voter Participation Rights, the plaintiffs
typically contend certain election-related rules, requirements, or
procedures, such as proof-of-citizenship requirements, voter iden-
tification laws, or reductions in early voting periods, disproportion-
ately impact minorities, making it harder for minorities to vote and
elect the candidates of their choice. In many of these cases, the
89. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
90. See, e.g., Ne. Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2265 (2017); One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Nichol, 186 F. Supp. 3d 958 (W.D.
Wisc. 2016).
91. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-53 (1959)
(holding that literacy tests that are administered in a race-neutral manner are constitu-
tionally permitted), with 52 U.S.C. § 10501 (Supp. III 2016) (prohibiting the use of literacy
tests to determine voter eligibility). 
92. Claims concerning state legislative districts are brought under the Equal Protection
Clause. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
379-80 (1963). Claims concerning congressional districts, in contrast, arise under Article I.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of members
chosen every second year by the people of the several States.”); see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
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challenged requirements are constitutionally valid; the plaintiffs
must argue that Congress may nevertheless prohibit such electoral
rules under the VRA as a purely prophylactic measure to protect
against the possibility of an undetectable constitutional violation
(such as hidden discriminatory intent).
Likewise, in cases involving Voter Associational Rights, the
plaintiffs do not necessarily contend that a particular legislative or
congressional redistricting scheme is unconstitutional. To the con-
trary, they effectively argue that the scheme violates the VRA be-
cause an alternate scheme would enhance minority voting power.
In other words, the challenged map is invalid because the state
could have created one or more additional majority-minority dis-
tricts to allow more minorities to elect the candidates of their
choice.93 They seek to use the VRA to compel states to engage in
prophylactic redistricting by drawing districts that are not actually
constitutionally required as a means of preventing the possibility of
discriminatory intent from infecting a legislative map. Both the
Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Boerne v. Flores and recent
developments in equal protection jurisprudence render these
applications of the VRA particularly susceptible to challenge.
II. BOERNE ’S EFFECT ON CONGRESS’S SECTION 5 POWER TO
ENFORCE THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Because the VRA applies to elections at all levels of government,94
its validity hinges initially on the scope of Congress’s power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress
to enforce the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,95 and
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which permits Congress to
prevent racial discrimination in voting.96 The Supreme Court’s re-
interpretation of Section 5 in City of Boerne v. Flores has jeopar-
dized the VRA’s constitutional underpinnings,97 requiring careful
93. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.16 (1986). 
94. See Morley, supra note 41, at 110.
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
96. See id. amend. XV. Even if the VRA falls within the scope of Congress’s power under
one or both of these provisions, it may still not exceed the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection
limits on Congress’s power. See infra Part III.
97. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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reassessment of the statute’s proper scope and application to pre-
vent the Court from invalidating it.
During the Civil Rights Era, the Court easily held that the VRA
was a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority. It con-
strued the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’ enforcement
clauses expansively, analogizing them to the Necessary and Proper
Clause.98 Katzenbach v. Morgan explains that Section 5 “author-
iz[es] Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”99 The provision empowers Congress to enact
any statutes that Congress itself deems to be “plainly adapted” to
enforcing a Fourteenth Amendment right.100
The Court stressed the need for deference to Congress’s determi-
nations in this regard.101 Section 5 grants Congress the prerogative
“to assess and weigh the ... conflicting considerations—the risk or
pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services, the
effectiveness” of its proposed intervention, “the adequacy or avail-
ability of alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of
the state[ ’s countervailing] interests.”102 The Court declined to “re-
view the congressional resolution of these factors.”103 Rather, the
Court would uphold a challenged statute if it could “perceive a ba-
sis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.”104
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court construed the Fif-
teenth Amendment’s enforcement provision in the same manner.105
It held, “Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the con-
stitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”106 The
Court added that the Enforcement Clause “indicate[s] that Congress
98. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (“By
including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to
the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper
Clause.”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-26 (1966) (“The basic test to be
applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as” for the Necessary
and Proper Clause).
99. 384 U.S. at 651. 
100. Id.
101. Id. at 653.
102. Id.
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. See 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
106. Id. at 324.
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was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in
§ 1.”107 This construction of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments’ enforcement clauses gave Congress broad authority to
protect against the prospect of racial discrimination in the electoral
process, leaving courts little power to overrule its determinations.
Importantly, the enforcement clauses permitted Congress to pro-
hibit state action even if it did not actually violate the underlying
substantive constitutional prohibitions.108 Thus, while the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments prohibit only intentional racial
discrimination in voting,109 Congress could prohibit electoral rules,
requirements, and procedures that had only a racially disparate
impact, even in the absence of intentional discrimination.110
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court adopted a much narrower in-
terpretation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.111 It began
by emphasizing the judiciary’s exclusive role in determining the
scope and meaning of constitutional rights.112 When Congress ex-
ercises its Enforcement Clause authority, it is bound by the judic-
iary’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
107. Id. at 326; see also id. (“Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.”). 
108. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980) (“Congress may, under
the authority of § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit state action that, though in itself
not violative of § 1, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.”), abrogated by Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see also Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 649 (holding that
Congress may enact legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause to
prohibit state action that threatens voting rights “[w]ithout regard to whether the judiciary
would find that the Equal Protection Clause itself ” renders the state’s conduct uncon-
stitutional).
109. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“[A]ction
by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.... [O]nly if there is purposeful discrimination can there
be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)); see also Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45, 50-53 (1959).
110. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173 (“[E]ven if § 1 of the [Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits
only purposeful discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that
Congress may not, pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.”
(footnote omitted)).
111. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
112. See id. at 519.
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Clause.113 As the Court explained, “Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is.”114
Boerne reaffirmed that Congress may go beyond merely prohi-
biting unconstitutional conduct to ban other, constitutionally per-
missible state actions in order to deter or remedy constitutional
violations.115 In Boerne’s key passage, the Court held, “There must
be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”116 Purely
prophylactic prohibitions that extend to constitutionally valid state
laws “may be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many
of the laws affected by the congressional enactment have a signifi-
cant likelihood of being unconstitutional.”117 Legislation that goes
beyond these restrictions cannot be deemed remedial, but rather
constitutes an attempted redefinition of the underlying substantive
right and exceeds Congress’s Enforcement Clause authority.118
The Court has applied this standard across a wide range of cases.
In Boerne itself, the Court struck down the Federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),119 insofar as it applied to state
and local laws and policies, because the “legislative record lack[ed]
examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed
because of religious bigotry.”120 Moreover, “RFRA [wa]s so out of
113. See id. (“The design of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and the text of § 5 are
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”). 
114. Id.
115. See id. at 518 (“Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall
within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional.”); see also Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282-83
(1999).
116. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520; see also Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S.
30, 43 (2012) (plurality opinion) (holding that, to invoke its Section 5 power, “Congress must
identify a pattern of constitutional violations and tailor a remedy congruent and proportional
to the documented violations”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (“[F]or Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions, and must tailor its
legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”).
117. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
118. See id. at 527.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993), invalidated by City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
120. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530; see also Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640, 647 (relying in
part on the fact that “Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part
of the States” to invalidate a patent protection statute as exceeding Congress’s Section 5
power).
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proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it [could
not] be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, uncon-
stitutional behavior.”121 In the years since Boerne, the Court has
held that numerous other federal laws likewise exceeded the scope
of Congress’s Section 5 powers, including the civil remedy provision
of the Violence Against Women Act122 and the Patent Remedy Act,123
as well as the self-care provision of the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA),124 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),125
and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),126 insofar
as they apply to state employers. To date, the only laws to survive
the Court’s scrutiny under Section 5 have been the FMLA’s family
care provisions as they apply to state employers127 and Title II of the
ADA as applied to public access to courthouses and prison condi-
tions.128
In considering whether a law satisfies Boerne’s congruence-and-
proportionality standard, the Court scrutinizes a variety of factors.
Most importantly, the Court assesses whether a record of actual
constitutional violations exists.129 It also considers whether the state
121. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
122. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(1994)).
123. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631, 640, 645-47 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994)).
124. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 33, 37 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2006)) (holding that there is no “evidence of a pattern of
state constitutional violations” for which the FMLA’s self-care provision is a “remedy drawn
in narrow terms”).
125. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1994)).
126. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364, 374 (2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12202
(2012)).
127. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-25, 740 (2003).
128. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513, 533-34 (2004); see also United States v.
Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153, 158-59 (2006) (allowing an inmate to bring a claim against the
state under Title II of the ADA based on statutory violations that also amounted to violations
of the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause).
129. See, e.g., Coleman, 566 U.S. at 41-42 (holding that the challenged FMLA provision
exceeded Congress’s Section 5 power because it was based on “supposition and conjecture”
rather than evidence in the legislative record of unconstitutional sex discrimination); Garrett,
531 U.S. at 368 (“The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that
Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment
against the disabled.”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 (holding that the ADEA exceeded Congress’s
Section 5 power because “Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the
States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional
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conduct Congress targeted is intentional, and hence potentially
unconstitutional, or instead merely negligent, and therefore does
not amount to a constitutional violation.130 Additionally, the avail-
ability of state-level remedies undermines the need for a federal law
under Section 5.131
Especially concerning from a voting rights perspective, the Court
has taken a dim view of statutes aimed primarily at eliminating
disparate impacts that do not themselves violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, the Coleman Court held that Congress
could not grant state employees a prophylactic right to take self-
care leave to alleviate the disparate impact that their employers’
facially neutral leave policies had against women (who were pur-
portedly more likely to exhaust their leave).132 Such disparate
impacts do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
explained, stating, “To the extent, then, that the self-care provision
addresses neutral leave policies with a disparate impact on women,
it is not directed at a pattern of constitutional violations.”133
Likewise, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court held that
Section 5 does not allow Congress to extend the ADEA to state
employers because the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit
age-based discrimination.134 These precedents confirm that the less
a law is targeted to constitutional violations (that is, the wider its
purely prophylactic breadth), the less likely the Court is to uphold
it.135
violation”). 
130. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 645 (1999) (holding that the Patent Remedy Act exceeds Congress’s Section 5 powers in
part because “Congress did not focus on instances of intentional or reckless [patent]
infringement” by states that would amount to due process violations). 
131. See, e.g., Coleman, 566 U.S. at 39 (holding that the FMLA’s self-care provision was not
a proportionate response to a constitutional violation since, at the time of the statute’s
enactment, nearly all states already offered employees sick leave and short-term disability
benefits); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643 (“Congress, however, barely considered the availability
of state remedies for patent infringement and hence whether the States’ conduct might have
amounted to a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
132. Coleman, 566 U.S. at 39.
133. Id. at 43. 
134. 528 U.S. at 83-84, 86. 
135. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 43 (holding that, because most states’ leave policies were not
unconstitutional, a federal law requiring states to provide additional self-care leave is a
disproportionate remedy); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 (holding that the ADEA exceeded Congress’s
Section 5 power because it “prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and
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Boerne’s congruence-and-proportionality test likely applies with
equal force to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Both Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment have materially identical language, empowering Con-
gress to “enforce” the respective provisions of each Amendment “by
appropriate legislation.”136 They were enacted barely a half year
apart from each other as part of Reconstruction. The Court has pre-
viously interpreted both provisions in an identical manner, an-
alogizing both provisions to the Necessary and Proper Clause.137
And both provisions raise the same separation-of-powers concerns
about the respective roles of Congress and the courts in constitu-
tional interpretation. Consequently, the Court is likely to extend
Boerne’s congruence-and-proportionality test to Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment.
Numerous critics have attacked Boerne. Jack Balkin contends
that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, its purpose, and its
Framers’ intentions all suggest that its Enforcement Clause should
be read as congruent with the Necessary and Proper Clause.138
Robert Post and Reva Siegel lament that Boerne marginalizes Con-
gress in defining the scope of the Equal Protection Clause’s anti-
discrimination protections because Congress is better situated than
courts “to perceive and express evolving cultural norms.”139 And
Douglas Laycock has powerfully contended that the Reconstruction
Amendments altered not only the relationship between the federal
government and the states, but between Congress and the courts.140
Laycock reads Section 5 against the backdrop of Congress’s distrust
practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection,
rational basis standard”); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646-47 (noting that “Congress did nothing
to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations”).
136. Compare U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5, with id. amend. XV, § 2.
137. Compare Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (construing Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment), with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 326 (1966)
(construing Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment).
138. Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1810, 1814-15
(2010).
139. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 520, 522, 525-26 (2000). Balkin also
defended Congress’s power to interpret constitutional provisions as conferring greater rights
than the Court chooses to recognize. See Balkin, supra note 138, at 1827.
140. See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 743, 763-66 (1998). 
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of the Supreme Court due to Dred Scott.141 He views Section 5 as
itself a prophylactic measure that empowers Congress to ensure
that the federal courts do not construe Fourteenth Amendment
rights too narrowly.142 Thus, in addition to empowering federal
courts to check the states, he contends that the Amendment was
intended to allow Congress to check the courts.
The Court shows no sign of abandoning the Boerne standard,
however, and has applied it across numerous statutory contexts, in-
cluding to antidiscrimination laws. Moreover, Boerne reinforces the
structural constitutional notion of limited powers,143 by preventing
Congress from deciding for itself the proper scope of its own au-
thority. The federal judiciary is typically regarded as the primary
guarantor of constitutional rights in the modern era.144 Boerne en-
ables it to play the same role in policing the limits of Congress’s
power to enforce those rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as it does with regard to Congress’s Article I and other
powers. While Laycock convincingly relates the skepticism that
some of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters expressed toward
the Court, it would be a radical upheaval—one unsupported by the
fairly limited legislative history he offers—to construe the amend-
ment as either authorizing departmentalism or requiring judicial
deference to a particular Congress’s interpretation of certain con-
stitutional provisions. Indeed, the entire endeavor of judicial review
is premised in part on the notion that the Constitution would be re-
duced to a mere parchment barrier if Congress were left to deter-
mine the bounds of its own power.145
Some commentators have cautioned that section 2 of the VRA is
susceptible to a Boerne challenge.146 Many others, however, have
141. See id. at 765 (citing Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)). 
142. See id. at 765-66. 
143. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533-34, 588 (2012). 
144. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 185 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (identifying the judiciary as having “the chief responsibility for
protecting constitutional rights”). 
145. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (holding that allowing
Congress to decide the meaning of the Constitution “would subvert the very foundation of all
written constitutions” and “giv[e] to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence”). 
146. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the
Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 138 (2010) (“Once the
Court focuses on the constitutionality of section 2, it will find arguments for striking it down
close at hand.”); Katz, supra note 40, at 2346-47. Others have argued that Congress’s 2006
2080 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2053
offered spirited defenses of the VRA despite Boerne’s limits on Con-
gress’s power. Professor Joshua Sellers argues that section 2 easily
satisfies Boerne because, despite the 1982 amendments extending
it to many types of disparate impact cases,147 courts nevertheless
still require evidence of discriminatory intent.148 As a descriptive
matter, this claim is highly debatable. More importantly, this argu-
ment defends section 2’s validity only at the expense of effectively
nullifying the 1982 amendments, which eliminated discriminatory
intent as an element of section 2 claims.
Professor Christopher Elmendorf offers a related defense.149 He
contends that section 2 is a congruent and proportionate response
to intentional racial discrimination by voters themselves in how
they cast their ballots.150 When a person votes, Elmendorf contends,
she is performing an official state action under color of law and is
therefore subject to Fourteenth Amendment restrictions.151 Many
voters, he maintains, may be unconstitutionally influenced by racial
considerations when deciding how to vote.152 While courts have no
practical way of targeting such unconstitutional conduct, Congress
may enact laws, such as section 2 of the VRA, pursuant to its Sec-
tion 5 enforcement power to remediate such potential discrimina-
tion.
Professor Elmendorf ’s creative approach ties the validity of sec-
tion 2 of the VRA to courts’ willingness to assume that a substantial
amendments expanding the scope of section 5 of the VRA might have rendered that provision
more susceptible to a Boerne challenge as well, though Shelby County has at least temporarily
mooted such concerns. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Pre-
clearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177,
179 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1714-15 (2004); Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 227-28 (2003) (arguing that
an extension of “Section 5 will not survive the congruence and proportionality test” and
recommending it be narrowed); cf. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New
Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 253 (2007).
147. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(June 29, 1982) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016)).
148. Joshua S. Sellers, The Irony of Intent: Statutory Interpretation and the Constitu-
tionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 LA. L. REV. 43, 46 (2015). 
149. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconsti-
tutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 448-56 (2012).
150. See id. at 385. 
151. See id. at 432, 436. 
152. See id. at 437-41. 
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fraction of the electorate is reasonably likely to be racially moti-
vated when voting. His argument raises difficult questions about
whether it is constitutionally impermissible—even if that prohi-
bition is unenforceable—for women or minorities to take into ac-
count the fact that a candidate is female or a minority when voting.
Moreover, it is unclear how plaintiffs would be able to persuasively
demonstrate such widespread bias, and whether courts would be
willing to effectively label a substantial fraction of the population
as racist.153 This argument may offer an even more precarious basis
for section 2 of the VRA than it currently rests upon.
Professor Pamela Karlan, expanding upon Elmendorf ’s approach,
offers one of the most powerful and comprehensive defenses of sec-
tion 2 the VRA.154 She contends that section 2 is defensible under
three separate “models”: the internal model, in which the law is
used to combat intentional racial discrimination within the electoral
system itself; the external model, in which it is used to alleviate the
effects of intentional discrimination outside the electoral system
that impacts minorities’ ability to participate in elections; and the
prospective model, under which it is used to prevent potential future
discrimination.155
Professor Karlan further points out that, although section 2 of the
VRA does not contain a sunset provision, the Supreme Court has
held it applies only when racial bloc voting exists.156 Consequently,
the VRA will cease having any effect when voters no longer engage
in racial bloc voting, meaning that members of all races have an
equal opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice.
Despite the appeal of her arguments, the current conservative
majority in the Court could easily reject them. Just as the Court
found the link between the possession of guns in school zones and
153. Such a potential holding may be comparable to the infamous “basket of deplorables”
comment from the 2016 presidential election cycle and raise similar concerns. Aaron Blake,
Voters Strongly Reject Hillary Clinton’s ‘Basket of Deplorables’ Approach, WASH. POST (Sept.
26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/26/voters-strongly-reject-
hillary-clintons-basket-of-deplorables-approach/?utm_term=.362b9074e31b [https://perma.cc/
72PQ-6F3T].
154. See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend
the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Karlan, Section 5 Squared];
Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies
After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, Two Section Twos].
155. Karlan, Two Section Twos, supra note 154, at 728-29.
156. Id. at 738-39, 741 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 53 n.21 (1986)). 
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interstate commerce too attenuated and speculative in United States
v. Lopez,157 so too might the Court find the link between societal dis-
crimination in housing, employment, and education, and certain
voters’ challenges in casting their ballots or having the candidates
of their choice prevail, too remote or tenuous. More fundamentally,
however, Shelby County demonstrates that the current Court sees
the problem of racial discrimination relating to voting as ebbing,
rather than simply mutating.158 Buoyed in part by high minority
voter registration and participation rates, as well as the success of
minority officials, the Court may continue to be unpersuaded by
arguments turning on the existence of widespread intentional dis-
crimination or generalized societal discrimination.
Professor Franita Tolson offers an equally compelling argu-
ment.159 She points out that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
subjects states to reduction in representation in the U.S. House of
Representatives if they improperly abridge or deny the right to
vote.160 Given the extremity of this remedy, she contends, Congress
surely may take the lesser step of enacting prophylactic measures
such as section 2 of the VRA to prevent violations of that right.161
Though I agree with much of Professor Tolson’s analysis, I draw a
different conclusion from the severity of section 2’s penalty. Courts
should consider the uniquely severe consequences that the Consti-
tution expressly authorizes—the political death penalty—in de-
ciding whether a state has denied or abridged the right to vote,
rather than applying the subjective, ad hoc Anderson-Burdick
balancing test.162 It is difficult to read section 2’s penalty provision,
which was deliberately crafted to leave southern states with the
choice of either extending the franchise to freed slaves or losing
representation in Congress,163 as implicitly authorizing Congress to
157. See 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
158. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625-29 (2013). 
159. See Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89
WASH. L. REV. 379, 425-38 (2014) [hereinafter Tolson, Constitutional Structure]; Franita
Tolson, What Is Abridgement?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 457-59
(2015) [hereinafter Tolson, What Is Abridgement?].
160. See Tolson, Constitutional Structure, supra note 159, at 425; Tolson, What Is Abridge-
ment?, supra note 159, at 457.
161. See Tolson, Constitutional Structure, supra note 159, at 425.
162. See Morley, supra note 55, at 296-97.
163. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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take other steps to compel states to expand voting rights, so long as
those measures are less severe.
Some commentators have sought to avoid potential constitutional
problems by urging adjustments in the prevailing judicial inter-
pretation of section 2 of the VRA. Professor Daniel Tokaji, for ex-
ample, argues that a plaintiff should prevail in a vote denial claim
if she demonstrates that a challenged election procedure has a dis-
parate impact against members of a minority group, that disparate
impact is traceable to social and historical discrimination against
that group, and the law is not justified by a sufficiently important
government interest.164 Others maintain that enough racially dis-
criminatory voting laws exist to build an evidentiary record to sat-
isfy Boerne.165
Encouragingly, Boerne and its progeny frequently cited various
VRA provisions as examples of laws that fall within the scope of
164. Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 439, 441, 474 (2015); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending the
New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349 (2006) (recognizing that “backup theories” are
necessary to ensure the Court does not invalidate the VRA). 
165. Victor Andres Rodríguez, Comment, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After
Boerne : The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 769, 815 (2003) (“[M]od-
ern examples of voting rights abuses continue to accumulate today.”). Relying on the preva-
lence of implicit racial bias, Professor Janai Nelson contends that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment allows Congress to prevent racial discrimination in voting, “even if such discrim-
ination is not purposeful.” Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54
B.C. L. REV. 579, 637 (2013). As noted earlier, however, the Court has elsewhere rejected the
notion that Section 5 allows Congress to target state practices giving rise to disparate im-
pacts, since such disparate impacts are not unconstitutional. See supra notes 132-35 and ac-
companying text.
In the context of section 5 of the VRA, Professor Rick Hasen suggested that Congress may
attempt to rely on the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment, as the basis for its authority. Hasen, supra note 146, at 204-05. Such reasoning
could apply with equal force to section 2 of the VRA, though the Court might conclude such
a measure goes far beyond what is necessary to ensure a state has a “Republican form of
Government.”
Other critical commentary on the issue includes Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-
Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001); Luke P. McLoughlin,
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and Tra-
jectory of Vote-Dilution Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 47-48 (2006); Michael J. Pitts, Con-
gressional Enforcement of Affirmative Democracy Through Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 185, 187-88 (2005); Jennifer G. Presto, The 1982 Amendments to Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act: Constitutionality After City of Boerne, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 609, 614-20 (2004); Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the Voting
Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
69, 71 (2003).
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Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.166 The Court declared,
for example, that laws prohibiting literacy tests and other practices
that the Constitution allows come “within Congress’ power to en-
force the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the bur-
dens those measures placed on the States.”167 It noted that literacy
tests in particular had “a long history as a ‘notorious means to deny
and abridge voting rights on racial grounds.’”168
Boerne also pointed to several aspects of section 5 of the VRA that
helped ensure its constitutionality: the act was “confined to those
regions of the country where voting discrimination had been most
flagrant,” it affected only “state voting laws,” and states could bail
out of VRA coverage.169 While Boerne emphasized that laws enacted
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment do not “require[ ]
termination dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates,”
such limits help ensure that a federal statute is “proportionate” to
preventing constitutional violations.170
Despite these trenchant and impassioned defenses of the VRA,
Boerne raises several concerns that remain largely unaddressed.
First, the post-Boerne cases pointing to the VRA as a permissible
exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment refer exclusively to provisions other than section 2 of
the VRA. These precedents extol the virtues of the VRA’s narrow,
specific provisions, such as its abolition of literacy tests, as well as
section 5 of the VRA, which was geographically limited, subject to
166. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (“[T]he [VRA is] a detailed but
limited remedial scheme designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fifteenth
Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abundant evidence of States’ systematic
denial of those rights was identified.”); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 283-85 (1999)
(“[W]e have specifically upheld the constitutionality of § 5 of the [VRA] against a challenge
that this provision usurps powers reserved to the States.... [T]he [VRA] ... intrudes on state
sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment permits this intrusion.”); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
167. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997).
168. Id. at 533 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 355 (1966) (Black, J.,
concurring and dissenting)). 
169. See id. at 532-33; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000)
(holding that the Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress’s Section 5 power in part
because it “applie[d] uniformly throughout the Nation,” rather than just in certain juris-
dictions in which Congress had identified a history of constitutional violations).
170. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
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a sunset provision, and contained a bailout provision171—and yet
still was effectively nullified in Shelby County.172 Section 2, in
contrast, applies nationally and is subject to neither a sunset pro-
vision nor bailout.173 As Ellen Katz ominously notes, “[T]he Boerne
cases appear to be doctrinally irreconcilable with the earlier VRA
precedent they purport to preserve.”174
Second, section 2 applies to a nearly limitless range of state
voting laws. Almost any voting requirement, restriction, or limita-
tion may have a racially disparate impact. In other contexts, the
Supreme Court has held that Congress may not use its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate disparate
impacts that are constitutionally permissible.175 The sheer sweep of
the statute raises questions about its validity.
Third, the history of section 2 is disconcertingly similar to that of
RFRA. In both cases, the Court had issued rulings narrowly con-
struing a constitutional amendment: Employment Division v. Smith,
which rejected disparate impact theory under the First Amend-
ment,176 and City of Mobile v. Bolden, which rejected disparate
impact theory under the Fifteenth Amendment.177 In both cases,
Congress passed a statute in disagreement with that ruling, seeking
to prohibit state actions that caused disparate impacts.178 While
other provisions of the VRA may raise no concerns under Boerne,
section 2 seems to squarely run afoul of it.
Fourth, at least in the modern era, many of the laws targeted by
section 2 are not the result of invidious racial discrimination, but
rather partisan motivations. Given the substantial overlap between
171. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4(a), 5, 79 Stat. 437, 438-39 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303(a), 10304 (Supp. III 2016)); see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 532-33.
172. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619-20, 2627, 2631 (2013).
173. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2.
174. Katz, supra note 40, at 2369.
175. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text. 
176. See 494 U.S. 872, 876-78 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb,
2000bb-1 to -4 (1993)), invalidated by City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
177. See 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
178. Compare Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, 2000bb-1 to -4 (1993)), invalidated by City
of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, with Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96
Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10303, 10503, 10508 (Supp. III 2016)).
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race and party identification,179 many election-related statutes that
lead to racially disparate impacts are often explicable primarily in
terms of partisan intent, which does not presently trigger strict
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.180 Thus, the Court may
not consider section 2 well-calibrated to prevent constitutional vi-
olations, even as a prophylactic measure.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, section 2 requires a
degree of race consciousness in crafting legislative districts and
electoral rules that not only is constitutionally unnecessary, but also
raises serious constitutional questions.181 Districts that are other-
wise constitutionally and legally permissible may violate section 2
solely based on the race of the people who reside in them. In at-
tempting to enforce Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights,
section 2 might compel considerations of race that run afoul of
them.182 Unless voting rights advocates develop a more defensible
construction of section 2 that lacks these vulnerabilities, there is a
serious risk the Court may continue what it started in Shelby Coun-
ty and conclude that section 2 of the VRA exceeds the scope of
Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
One way the Court could attempt to reconcile section 2 of the VRA
with Boerne is to interpret and apply it in light of traditional reme-
dial principles. The Court has recognized that the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments’ enforcement clauses empower Congress to
not only prohibit state laws and actions that are actually unconsti-
tutional,183 but also impose certain other prophylactic measures to
prevent constitutional violations from occurring.184 The principles
the Court has developed for determining the proper scope of pro-
phylactic injunctions offer a well-established, objective standard for
determining the proper prophylactic sweep of section 2 of the VRA.
179. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three
Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1837 (2018); see also Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I ), 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999). 
180. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 551; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). 
181. See generally Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II ), 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Shaw, 509 U.S.
630.
182. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1469, 1472 (2017); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557, 579-80 (2009).
183. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006). 
184. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
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Injunctions, like statutes enacted under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments’ enforcement clauses, may not only prohibit a
defendant from engaging in illegal conduct, but also forbid a range
of other, otherwise legal conduct to ensure that violations of the un-
derlying core prohibition do not occur.185 Such prophylactic relief is
appropriate when necessary to ensure an underlying right is fully
enforced.186
Numerous factors can establish the need for, and hence the
legitimacy of, prophylactic relief in a particular case. It is often nec-
essary when the boundary between permissible and impermissible
conduct is hazy, or it is hard to detect or prove violations of the legal
provisions at issue.187 Prophylactic injunctions are also appropriate
where the defendant has a history of willfully violating the underly-
ing legal restrictions.188 They are frequently used to prohibit certain
otherwise permissible acts that increase the likelihood of a legal vio-
lation occurring.189 Conversely, because the main purpose of pro-
phylactic relief is to fully and effectively enforce an underlying right,
it cannot be divorced from that right. The Court has repeatedly in-
validated prophylactic injunctions imposing restrictions that were
“too far removed from the [underlying] harm to be an acceptable
remedial means.”190
185. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 287-93 (4th
ed. 2010); Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of
Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 936-38 (1999); Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic
Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52
BUFF. L. REV. 301, 314-15 (2004). 
186. See Landsberg, supra note 185, at 967 (“The legitimacy of a prophylactic rule flows
from finding a risk to a core right.”); Thomas, supra note 185, at 309 (“Prophylactic remedies
have been upheld only where the enjoining of affiliated conduct is necessary to achieve the
aim of remedying an illegality.”); see, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 & n.9 (1978)
(holding that prophylactic relief against prison officials was permissible to ensure prison
conditions immediately returned to constitutionally permissible levels).
187. David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing
the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 679-80 (1988) (arguing that an
injunction may require actions going “beyond the plaintiff ’s rightful position ... [w]hen the
judge cannot easily demarcate a clear boundary between legal and illegal conduct” or it is
“necessary to prevent falling short of the plaintiff ’s rightful position”); see Thomas, supra
note 185, at 372-79.
188. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 687 & n.9; Thomas, supra note 185, at 356-57. 
189. See Thomas, supra note 185, at 322-23, 346. 
190. Id. at 344 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 94-95, 100 (1995)); see, e.g., Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357-60 (1996) (invalidating injunction requiring a prison to make
extensive legal library resources available to inmates because it went far beyond the limited
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Courts should assess whether section 2 of the VRA may be appli-
ed prophylactically to prohibit particular state election laws, poli-
cies, and procedures that do not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments by applying the remedial principles governing injunc-
tions. Section 2 may be applied more aggressively as a preventive
measure to defendant entities and officials that have a recent his-
tory of constitutional violations. Courts should also be more willing
to apply it in circumstances where detecting an actual constitutional
violation would be impracticable or impossible, particularly where
the government defendants cannot affirmatively dispel substantial
doubts about the constitutionality of its actions (that is, whether
they were impermissibly motivated by unconstitutional racial con-
siderations).
Likewise, courts should ensure that remedies under section 2 of
the VRA are tailored so they are no broader than necessary to
achieve their prophylactic purposes. For example, rather than com-
pletely enjoining constitutionally valid state voter identification
laws that violate section 2, a court could impose the narrower relief
of requiring states to make voter identification cards widely avail-
able for free under specified circumstances as a condition of con-
tinuing to enforce the identification requirement. By interpreting
and applying section 2 of the VRA in accordance with traditional
remedial principles, the Court can establish an objective boundary
to the statute’s prophylactic reach and eliminate concerns about
whether it is a congruent and proportional means of enforcing con-
stitutional voting rights.
III. THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHT TO VOTE
Another increasingly important restriction on Congress’s power
to regulate elections is the presently evolving line of equal protec-
tion jurisprudence treating voting as a fundamental right that
must be enforced equally for all constitutionally qualified voters.191
constitutional violations the plaintiffs established). 
191. “Constitutionally qualified” refers to people for whom Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as modified by subsequent amendments, recognizes a right to vote. It refers to
inhabitants of a state who are U.S. citizens and at least eighteen years old, and have not been
convicted of a felony. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
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Section A explains that the Constitution was not historically under-
stood as limiting state discretion over most aspects of the electoral
process. While the Reconstruction Amendments prohibited inten-
tional racial discrimination,192 states were largely left free to deter-
mine the scope of their respective electorates, legislative district
boundaries, and electoral processes and regulations.193
Section B examines the Court’s early voting rights jurisprudence
under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court subjected laws ex-
panding the right to vote to members of certain groups to rational
basis scrutiny, leaving Congress broad leeway under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to make voting easier for favored
constituencies. While the rational basis test offered less judicial
protection for voting rights, it afforded Congress greater flexibility
to extend voting protections one step at a time. In many senses,
applying the rational basis test in this context led to a pro-voting
construction of the Equal Protection Clause: laws that facilitated
voting would be upheld, even if they did so on a limited basis, only
for members of certain groups.
Finally, Section C contends that modern voting rights case law
rejects this traditional conception of equal protection. A still-
developing line of authority strongly suggests that, since voting is
a fundamental right, laws selectively facilitating voting only by
members of certain groups are subject to strict scrutiny and there-
fore generally unconstitutional. Under this voting-as-a-fundamen-
tal-right approach, Congress generally may not establish special
protections for voting rights on a piecemeal basis. This reconceptu-
alization of equal protection as it applies to voting effectively limits
the scope of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Even if a statute would be valid under Boerne,194 Con-
gress may no longer have discretion to single out certain groups of
voters for additional or special prophylactic protection.
This evolution of voting rights doctrine, although salutary in
many respects, may pose unexpected challenges for voting rights
advocates. While this emerging new approach strengthens judicial-
192. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV.
193. See Morley, Rethinking, supra note 82, at 193-97 (explaining that state supreme courts
generally rejected challenges under state constitutions to nondiscriminatory election-related
regulations).
194. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
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ly enforceable voting rights, it concomitantly constrains Congress’s
ability to protect them legislatively.
A. Voting and Elections as Predominantly Political Matters
As originally enacted, the Constitution conferred surprisingly
limited voting rights, leaving states virtually unlimited latitude
over the matter. Although states were required to maintain a re-
publican form of government,195 the Constitution did not compel
them to extend the right to vote for state or local offices to any par-
ticular people.196 And the Constitution conferred a limited right to
vote only for a single federal office: anyone who a state permitted to
vote for the most numerous house of a state’s legislature was also
entitled to vote for the U.S. House of Representatives.197
Other than this contingent right to participate in House elections,
the Constitution did not establish a right to vote for any other con-
stitutional office. State legislatures directly appointed U.S. Sen-
ators.198 The President was chosen by presidential electors, rather
than directly by voters,199 and state legislatures were free to decide
for themselves how presidential electors would be selected.200 And
the President nominated Supreme Court Justices and other federal
judges.201
The Constitution’s general failure to recognize voting as an en-
forceable right is underscored by the fact that most aspects of the
electoral process were left to the apparently exclusive discretion of
the political branches of both the federal and state governments.
The Constitution specifically empowered state legislatures and Con-
gress to regulate the time, place, and manner of federal elections.202
195. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a republican form of government.”).
196. See Morley, supra note 41, at 106.
197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he electors in each State shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.”). 
198. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
199. Id. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3.
200. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature
thereof may direct, a number of electors.”).
201. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
202. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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As noted above, state legislatures likewise had authority to decide
how to select their respective presidential electors.203
The political branches were also responsible for determining
the results of federal elections. Each house of Congress determines
“the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.”204
Congress also was responsible for counting presidential electoral
votes.205 If no candidate for President received a majority of electoral
votes, the House selected the President; if a tie occurred among the
top candidates for Vice President, the Senate determined which of
those candidates should prevail.206 Again, such surprisingly perva-
sive political control over the conduct and outcomes of federal elec-
tions confirms that the Constitution originally treated elections as
a primarily political issue rather than a matter of constitutional
right.207
This view of elections persisted into the twentieth century. Al-
though the Twelfth Amendment restructured the presidential selec-
tion process,208 the houses of Congress remained firmly in charge of
counting electoral votes.209 The Electoral Count Act, enacted in the
late 1800s, expressly recognized the power of the chambers of Con-
gress to determine the validity of electoral votes and choose between
competing slates of presidential electors from a state.210
The Reconstruction Amendments expressly mention voting rights
but, as originally intended and understood, left Congress largely in
control. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, which have come to be con-
strued as the primary constitutional sources of the right to vote.211
Neither Clause mentions voting, however. Section 2, in contrast,
contains the Constitution’s only express reference to an affirmative
203. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
204. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
205. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
206. Id.
207. See Michael T. Morley, The New Elections Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 79,
90-91 (2016) (arguing the Framers “believed that Congress was the only entity that could be
‘trusted’ with control over the electoral process” (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 220 (Legal Classics Library 1986) (1826))).
208. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, with id. amend. XII.
209. Id. amend. XII.
210. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2012); cf. id. § 5 (providing that, if a state appoints its electors by a
specified safe-harbor deadline, its choice shall be binding on Congress). 
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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right to vote. It states, “[W]hen the right to vote at any election” for
federal or state office “is denied to any of the male inhabitants of [a]
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced”
proportionally.212 This provision’s gender restriction has been elim-
inated,213 and its age restriction modified,214 by subsequent amend-
ments.215
Section 2 underscores the primacy of the political branches con-
cerning the right to vote. The Senate had repeatedly rejected pro-
posed language that would have directly required states to extend
the franchise.216 Rather than compelling states to expand their elec-
torates, the Amendment was specifically crafted to leave them dis-
cretion about whether to do so.
From the perspective of the congressional Republicans who en-
acted it, the Amendment created a win-win situation. Senator Thad-
deus Stevens explained, “The effect of this provision will be either to
compel the [southern] States to grant universal suffrage or so to
shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a hopeless
minority in the national Government, both legislative and execu-
tive.”217 If southern states expanded the franchise to former slaves,
those new voters would join with white Republican sympathizers in
those states and elect Republican politicians.218 Conversely, if south-
ern states declined to allow former slaves to vote, they would lose
seats in the House of Representatives and Electoral College, and Re-
publicans would dominate the federal government.219 The amend-
ment vested responsibility for implementing such reductions in
212. Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
213. Id. amend. XIX, § 1.
214. Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
215. Morley, supra note 55, at 291 (“[A]s modified by subsequent amendments, § 2 per-
tains to the right to vote of U.S. citizens (regardless of gender) who are at least 18 years old,
and have not been disenfranchised for committing a crime or participating in rebellion.”
(footnote omitted)).
216. Id. at 315.
217. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens) (empha-
sis added).
218. See id.
219. See id. at 2459-60. 
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representation in Congress, as part of its standard reapportion-
ment responsibilities.220
The Fifteenth Amendment—like subsequent voting rights amend-
ments221—does not affirmatively grant anyone the right to vote.
Rather, it specifies only that states may not “den[y] or abridg[e]” the
right to vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”222 Although the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits states
from denying the right to vote for race-related reasons, it does not
limit a state’s power to restrict the franchise on other grounds.223
Together, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fif-
teenth Amendment suggest that the Equal Protection Clause was
not originally intended to create or protect a judicially enforceable
right to vote. It would have made little sense for Congress to leave
states discretion under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to refuse to extend voting rights to former slaves or other minorities
if Section 1 of that same Amendment compelled them to do so,224
whether as a result of its prohibition of racial discrimination or of
discrimination concerning fundamental rights. Moreover, if the
Framers of the Equal Protection Clause believed that it prohibited
racial discrimination in voting, the Fifteenth Amendment would
have been mere surplusage.225
220. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Morley, supra note 55, at 324-29 (discussing efforts
of the 41st Congress to implement Section 2).
221. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 (prohibiting discrimination concerning the right to
vote based on sex); id. amend. XXIV, § 1 (prohibiting discrimination concerning the right to
vote in federal elections based on failure to pay a poll tax); id. amend. XXVI, § 1 (prohibiting
discrimination concerning the right to vote based on age, for people who are at least eighteen
years old).
222. Id. amend. XV, § 1.
223. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959)
(holding that the Fifteenth Amendment does not prohibit states from using literacy tests).
224. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 594 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The com-
prehensive scope of the second section [of the Fourteenth Amendment] ... preclude[s] the
suggestion that the first section was intended” to create a judicially enforceable right to vote);
Morley, supra note 55, at 298 (“Section 1’s general language should not be read as implicitly
creating a broader right to vote than the finely tuned provisions in § 2 that specifically and
directly address the issue.”).
225. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1435 n.158 (2002) (“That voting is a fundamental right would make any
infringement on it subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny and would seem to make
additional Fifteenth Amendment scrutiny redundant.”); Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering
and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why Won’t It Go Away?, 33
UCLA L. REV. 257, 269 n.43 (1985) (“[A]nalyz[ing] voting rights as proceeding from the four-
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Post-Civil War jurisprudence confirms that, notwithstanding the
Reconstruction Amendments, control over the right to vote remain-
ed with the political branches. In Minor v. Happersett, decided only
a few years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the
Court unanimously held that states could continue to deny women
the right to vote.226 It declared, “[T]he Constitution of the United
States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one.”227 The
Court noted that, if Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment “had
been intended to make all citizens of the United States voters, the
framers of the Constitution would not have left it to implication. So
important a change ... would have been expressly declared.”228
A few decades later, the court upheld a one-year residency re-
quirement for voting, declaring,
The privilege to vote in any State is not given by the Federal
Constitution, or by any of its amendments.... [T]he privilege to
vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to
be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms as to
it may seem proper.229
teenth amendment” renders the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments “thoroughly super-
fluous”); see also Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927) (finding it “unnecessary to
consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and
obvious infringement of the Fourteenth” than a law prohibiting African Americans from
participating in the Democratic Party’s primary elections); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162,
175 (1874) (noting that the Fifteenth Amendment would have been unnecessary if voting were
a privilege or immunity of national citizenship); cf. Mark R. Killenbeck & Steve Sheppard,
Another Such Victory? Term Limits, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right
to Representation, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1181 (1994) (“[T]he Fifteenth Amendment made
Section 2 unnecessary only if Section 2’s sole objective was to enfranchise the freedmen by
exacting a penalty for the failure to do so.”).
226. 88 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he constitutions and laws of the several States which commit that
important trust [of voting] to men alone are not necessarily void.”).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 173. The Court further pointed out that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
allowed a state to have its representation in Congress reduced only if it denied male citizens
the right to vote. Id. at 174. If the Fourteenth Amendment required states to permit women
to vote, the Court asked rhetorically, “why inflict the penalty for the exclusion of males
alone?” Id.
229. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904), abrogated by Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); see also Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 335 (1900) (“The general right to vote
in the State of Missouri is primarily derived from the State.”).
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The Court concluded that the residency requirement did not deny
new residents “equal protection of the laws, nor is it repugnant to
any fundamental or inalienable rights of citizens of the United
States, nor a violation of any implied guaranties of the Federal
Constitution.”230 Applying such reasoning, the Court also upheld
a state law imposing special voter registration requirements and
procedures just for residents of cities above a certain population, of
which the state had only one.231
Most major cases involving the constitutional right to vote in the
decades after the Reconstruction Amendments were ratified were
brought under the Fifteenth Amendment rather than the Equal
Protection Clause, further confirming a general understanding that
the Equal Protection Clause focused on civil, rather than political,
rights.232 The Court repeatedly reiterated that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment did not affirmatively guarantee to anyone a right to vote,233
suggesting that states could condition the franchise on “age, proper-
ty, or education” requirements.234 It did not mention whether such
restrictions would implicate Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The Court reaffirmed this principle as late as 1959 in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections, upholding the constitution-
ality of literacy tests for voting.235 It recited, “The States have long
230. Pope, 193 U.S. at 633.
231. Mason, 179 U.S. at 333, 335 (“[T]he circumstance that the registration law in force in
the city of St. Louis was made to differ in essential particulars from that which regulates the
conduct of elections in other cities in the State of Missouri, does not in itself deny to the
citizens of St. Louis the equal protection of the laws.”).
232. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 222-23 (2011). 
233. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1915) (“[T]he [Fifteenth] Amendment
gives no right of suffrage.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (“[T]he
Constitution of the United States has not conferred the right of suffrage upon any one.”);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875) (“The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer
the right of suffrage upon any one.”). The Court elaborated that
[the Fifteenth] Amendment does not take away from the state governments in
a general sense the power over suffrage which has belonged to those govern-
ments from the beginning and without the possession of which power the whole
fabric upon which the division of state and national authority under the Con-
stitution ... rest[s] would be without support.
Guinn, 238 U.S. at 362; see also id. (“[T]he [Fifteenth] Amendment does not change, modify
or deprive the States of their full power as to suffrage except of course as to the subject with
which the Amendment deals.”).
234. Reese, 92 U.S. at 217-18.
235. 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959).
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been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under
which the right of suffrage may be exercised, absent of course the
discrimination which the Constitution condemns.”236 The Court held
that, although literacy was not a perfect proxy for intelligence, “[t]he
ability to read and write ... has some relation to standards designed
to promote intelligent use of the ballot.”237 So long as a literacy test
was neither adopted with a discriminatory purpose, nor implement-
ed in a discriminatory manner, the Court concluded, it is valid.238
The Court’s conceptualization of voting as a primarily political
matter controlled by legislatures and Congress, rather than a judi-
cially enforceable fundamental right, is epitomized in Justice Felix
Frankfurter’s well-known opinion in Colegrove v. Green.239 Colegrove
held that constitutional challenges to population differences among
congressional districts are nonjusticiable.240 Justice Frankfurter ex-
plained, “It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary
in the politics of the people.”241 The Constitution makes Congress
responsible for ensuring “fair representation by the States”; if it
fails in that task, “the remedy ultimately lies with the people.”242 He
famously emphasized, “Courts ought not to enter this political
thicket.”243 Even Gomillion v. Lightfoot, in which the Court struck
down an intentional racial gerrymander of the boundaries of
Tuskegee, Alabama, into “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” to
exclude Black voters, was based solely on the Fifteenth Amendment,
rather than the Equal Protection Clause.244
236. Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
237. Id. at 51.
238. Cf. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 151-56 (1965) (holding that a voting
registration test which required a person to give a reasonable interpretation of any consti-
tutional provision was unconstitutional because examiners had broad discretion in adminis-
tering it, and they did so in a discriminatory manner to prevent Blacks from registering);
Guinn, 238 U.S. at 365, 367 (holding that a literacy test with a grandfather clause was uncon-
stitutional because its only purpose was to perpetuate the discrimination that the Fifteenth
Amendment outlawed).
239. 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
240. See id. at 555-56.
241. Id. at 553-54.
242. Id. at 554.
243. Id. at 556.
244. 364 U.S. 339, 340, 346-48 (1960).
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B. Into the Political Thicket: Equal Protection as a Pro-Voting,
Rational Basis Norm
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Gray v. Sanders heralded a new era in voting rights jurisprudence
under the Equal Protection Clause.245 The previous year, Baker v.
Carr had held that an equal protection challenge to population dis-
parities among legislative districts was justiciable, strongly sug-
gesting that the Equal Protection Clause protected voting rights in
addition to civil rights.246 In Gray, the Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause precluded Georgia from applying its “county unit”
voting rule in statewide party primaries, because it gave each resi-
dent of a sparsely populated county nearly one hundred times the
influence over the outcome of a primary as a resident of a densely
populated county.247
The Gray Court explained, “Once the geographical unit for which
a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in
the election are to have an equal vote .... This is required by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.... [E]very
voter is equal to every other voter in his State.”248 Reynolds v. Sims
went on to apply this principle to conclude that the Equal Protection
Clause requires legislative districts to be drawn with roughly equal
populations, unless a disparity is necessary to further a strong state
interest.249
245. See 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
246. See 369 U.S. 186, 227, 232 (1962) (“But because any reliance on the Guaranty Clause
could not have succeeded it does not follow that appellants may not be heard on the equal
protection claim which in fact they tender.”). Following Baker, the Court held that Article I
of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be com-
posed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States.”), requires
states to ensure that congressional districts contain as equal populations as possible. Wes-
berry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (“[A]s nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”). Wesberry rejected the notion that
this issue was committed to the political branches, declaring that “[t]he right to vote is too
important in our free society to be stripped of judicial protection.” Id. at 7.
247. Gray, 372 U.S. at 371, 379, 381.
248. Id. at 379-80.
249. 377 U.S. 533, 576, 579 (1964).
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2. Expansion of Equal Protection Voting Rights: Voter
Eligibility Rights
Building on its “one-person, one-vote” precedents, the Court went
on to hold that the Equal Protection Clause also protects another,
more fundamental aspect of the right to vote: Voter Eligibility
Rights. In Carrington v. Rash, the Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a state from categorically forbidding
active-duty servicemembers who are stationed there from regis-
tering to vote.250 Citing Lassiter, it recognized that states have the
right to establish “qualifications for the exercise of the franchise.”251
The Carrington Court nevertheless ruled that the Equal Protection
Clause places substantive restrictions—beyond those of subsequent
voting rights amendments—on a state’s discretion to set voter
qualifications.
The majority claimed it was applying rational basis scrutiny. It
explained, “The courts must reach and determine the question
whether the classifications drawn ... are reasonable in light of [the
State’s] purpose.”252 The State’s first asserted interest in barring
servicemembers from voting was “prevent[ing] ... a ‘takeover’ of
the civilian community.”253 The Court rejected that rationale, de-
claring that the Constitution prohibits states from “‘[f]encing out’
... a sector of the population” from voting “because of the way they
may vote.”254 Carrington presents this principle, without citation,
as an unremarkable, self-evident proposition,255 rather than a dra-
matic limitation on states’ traditional power to determine the scope
of their own electorates.256
The State’s other claimed justification for excluding service-
members from voting was “the transient nature of service in the
Armed Forces.”257 Had the Court truly been applying traditional
rational basis scrutiny, as the opinion contends,258 this rationale
250. 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
251. Id. at 91 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959)).
252. Id. at 93 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 94.
255. See id.
256. See supra Part III.A.
257. Carrington, 380 U.S. at 94.
258. See id. at 96; see also id. at 99 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The question here is simply
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would have been sufficient. A legislative classification is valid even
if it is over- or underinclusive, or based on legislative assumptions
or generalizations rather than precise evidence.259 The Carrington
Court nevertheless invalidated the State’s conclusive presumption
that active servicemembers are not domiciled there.260 It explained,
“States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote
because of some remote administrative benefit to the State. By
forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of nonresi-
dence, the Texas Constitution imposes an invidious discrimina-
tion.”261 Carrington might be best characterized as an example of
“rational basis with bite.”262
Regardless of the level of scrutiny applied, Carrington marked a
much greater departure from the Court’s equal protection juris-
prudence than the opinion itself suggests.263 As discussed above,
previous equal protection cases concerned legislative district bound-
aries and the weight to be afforded eligible voters’ ballots. Carring-
ton appears to be the first time that the Court ever held that a
person who was ineligible to vote due to a state legal provision that
neither drew racial classifications nor was racially motivated could
nevertheless assert a federal constitutional right to vote.264
The magnitude of Carrington’s seismic shift in equal protection
jurisprudence is apparent from Justice John Marshall Harlan’s
whether the differentiation in voting eligibility requirements which Texas has made is
founded on a rational classification.”).
259. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955) (“[T]he law need
not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.... The legislature
may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.”); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938).
260. See Carrington, 380 U.S. at 94, 96-97.
261. Id. at 96 (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)).
262. The phrase “rational basis with bite” is most commonly used to characterize the
Court’s precedents concerning discrimination against the mentally disabled, see City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42, 446, 450 (1985), and homo-
sexuals, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33, 635 (1996). Gerald Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1972); see also Raphael Holoszyc-
Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2093-95 (2015).
263. See Carrington, 380 U.S. at 97 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the majority
opinion treats the notion that “state laws governing the qualifications of voters are subject to
the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause” as “an established constitutional tenet”).
264. See id. at 96 (majority opinion) (holding that a state “may not casually deprive a class
of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the State”).
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emphatic dissent. After briefly pointing out that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause “was not intended to touch state electoral matters,” he
noted that the Court’s “one-person, one-vote” rulings did not require
it to apply the Equal Protection Clause to voter qualifications.265 He
added that Texas’s distinction between servicemembers and other
voters could survive rational basis scrutiny.266
The Court enforced Voter Eligibility Rights under the Equal
Protection Clause again in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
holding that states may not impose poll taxes for state and local
elections.267 The opinion is somewhat inconsistent as to the level of
scrutiny the Court applied. On the one hand, the Court stated,
“[W]here fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”268
These references to “fundamental rights” and “close[ ] scrutin[y]”
suggest strict scrutiny.269 On the other hand, the Court stated sev-
eral times that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits poll taxes270
because there is no relationship between voter qualifications and
either wealth or payment of a tax.271 This analysis is more reminis-
cent of rational basis review. A rational basis interpretation is also
265. Id. at 97-98, 98 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that previous rulings “were
concerned with methods of constituting state legislatures; this case involves state voter
qualifications”).
266. Id. at 99, 101 (“The question here is simply whether the differentiation in voting
eligibility requirements which Texas has made is founded on a rational classification.”).
Empirically, Harlan explained, few servicemembers stationed in Texas actually intended to
establish a permanent domicile there. See id. at 100. Likewise, conceptually, people compell-
ed to live in Texas by military orders seemed categorically less likely to wish to remain than
those who chose to move there. See id. at 99-100. Perhaps most controversially, he concluded
that Texas had a valid interest in protecting itself “against the influences of military voting
strength.” See id. at 101.
267. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits the federal
government and states from imposing poll taxes only on federal elections. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XXIV, § 1.
268. Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 666 (“[A] State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard.”).
271. Id. (“Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this
or any other tax.”); id. at 668 (“Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability
to participate intelligently in the electoral process.”); id. at 670 (“[W]ealth or fee paying has,
in our view, no relation to voting qualifications.”).
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more consistent with later case law concluding that wealth-based
distinctions do not receive any type of heightened scrutiny.272
By the Court’s 1969 ruling in Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict No. 15, however, the doctrine had crystallized that restrictions
on voter qualifications or eligibility are subject to strict scrutiny.273
Kramer is particularly noteworthy because it sets forth a highly re-
visionist interpretation of Voter Eligibility Rights under the Equal
Protection Clause. It cites Carrington for the proposition that voter
qualifications are subject to strict scrutiny, despite the fact that
Carrington called for only rational basis scrutiny (or, more accu-
rately, rational basis with bite).274 Thus, over the course of only a
few years, voting rights under the Equal Protection Clause grew
from just Voter Equality Rights to Voter Eligibility Rights, as well.
3. Rational Basis Scrutiny for Laws Helping Certain Groups
Vote
In the late 1960s, the Court went on to extend its equal protection
voting rights jurisprudence yet again, this time to Voter Participa-
tion Rights. Whereas Kramer had endorsed strict scrutiny for laws
that burdened Voter Eligibility Rights by prohibiting certain people
from voting, the Court applied only rational basis scrutiny in equal
protection challenges to laws that facilitated voting only by mem-
bers of certain groups. In McDonald v. Board of Election Commis-
sioners, a class of pretrial detainees who were jailed in their home
272. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (“[T]his Court has never held that financial
need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.”); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970) (applying rational basis scrutiny to restrictions in
welfare law). But see McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (noting
that “lines ... drawn on the basis of wealth or race” are “highly suspect and thereby demand
a more exacting judicial scrutiny”).
273. 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (“[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to
some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others,
the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state
interest.” (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965))); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 334, 342-43 (1972) (subjecting a yearlong state residency requirement and three-
month county residency requirement for voting to strict scrutiny).
274. See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627 (citing Carrington, 380 U.S. at 96); cf. Dunn, 405 U.S. at
362 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting “that Kramer appears to have elevated the standard”
of scrutiny for voting rights claims, because Carrington had required only that “voting re-
quirements be reasonable”).
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counties, and had either been charged with nonbailable offenses or
were unable to afford bail, argued that the Equal Protection Clause
entitled them to vote by absentee ballot.275 Illinois law allowed a
voter to cast an absentee ballot only if the person was absent from
his or her county of residence, medically incapacitated, unable to
vote due to observance of a religious holiday, or serving as a poll
watcher on Election Day.276 The inmates claimed that the law drew
two sets of irrational distinctions: first, between medically incapa-
citated voters who were permitted to vote absentee, and voters who
were physically incapacitated due to pretrial detention; and second,
between inmates held in jails outside their home county, who were
permitted to vote absentee, and those held within their home coun-
ty, who did not qualify for absentee ballots.277
Although the challenged restrictions concerned voting, the Court
concluded they were subject only to rational basis review.278 It held
that the law did not restrict “the fundamental right to vote,” but
rather only “a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.”279 It went
275. 394 U.S. 802, 803 (1969).
276. Id. at 803-04.
277. Id. at 806.
278. Id. at 809.
279. Id. at 807. The Court added—oddly, given that the plaintiffs were incarcerated—that
it could not “assume, with nothing in the record to support such an assumption, that Illinois
has in fact precluded appellants from voting.” Id. at 808. The Court speculated, without any
evidentiary basis in the record, that the State might “possibly furnish the jails with special
polling booths or facilities on election day, or provide guarded transportation to the polls
themselves for certain inmates, or entertain motions for temporary reductions in bail to allow
some inmates to get to the polls on their own.” Id. at 808 n.6. If such measures existed, of
course, it is unlikely that inmates would have sued to obtain absentee ballots; moreover, the
State undoubtedly would have pointed to such alternatives in its briefs. Indeed, if the State
had a policy of implementing any such measures or had done so in past elections, the Court
likely could have taken judicial notice of it. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 1101(a) (providing that the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to the Supreme Court). The Court’s willingness to
hypothesize such extremely unlikely possibilities appears to have been an attempt to dodge
the main issue in the case by assuming the prisoners would be able to vote. When the Court
was squarely and unavoidably confronted with pretrial detainees who alleged and proved they
had no alternate means of voting, in O’Brien v. Skinner, the Court unanimously concluded
that the State’s refusal to provide absentee ballots was “whole arbitrary” and therefore voided
the Equal Protection Clause. 414 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1974); see also Am. Party of Texas v.
White, 415 U.S. 767, 794-95 (1974) (“[P]ermitting absentee voting by some classes of voters
and denying the privilege to other classes of otherwise qualified voters in similar circum-
stances, without affording a comparable alternative means to vote, is an arbitrary discrim-
ination violative of the Equal Protection Clause.”); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 521-22
(1973) (finding that plaintiffs presenting such a claim raised a substantial federal question
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on to explain that, while the absentee ballot laws were “designed to
make voting more available to some groups who cannot easily get to
the polls,” they did not “deny [anyone] the exercise of the fran-
chise.”280 Consequently, they were subject only to rational basis re-
view.281 Applying such scrutiny, the Court held that restrictions on
absentee voting “will be set aside only if no grounds can be con-
ceived to justify them,” regardless of the legislature’s actual basis
for enacting them.282 It easily hypothesized rationales for the limits
in the state’s absentee voting law.283
McDonald established a core principle that would play a major
role in early equal protection voting rights jurisprudence: when a
law makes voting easier for members of some groups, but not others,
its limitations are subject only to rational basis scrutiny.284 The
Court specifically lauded the state’s “policy of adding, over a 50-year
period, groups to the absentee coverage as their existence comes to
the attention of the legislature.”285 Critically, the Court emphasized,
“That Illinois ha[d] not gone still further, as perhaps it might,
should not render void its remedial legislation, which need not ...
‘strike at all evils at the same time.’”286
Later cases endorsed and applied the principle that Congress may
facilitate or reinforce the right to vote only for members of certain
groups without triggering any form of heightened scrutiny.287 In
that warranted convening a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (2012)).
280. McDonald, 394 U.S. at 807-08.
281. Id. at 809.
282. Id.
283. The Court found the distinction between medically incapacitated voters and pretrial
detainees “quite reasonable.” Id. It likewise held that allowing detainees jailed outside their
home counties to vote absentee, while prohibiting those detained within their home counties
from doing so, was rational because local officials might be more likely to influence the votes
of the latter group. Id. at 810.
284. See, e.g., id. at 809 (“Illinois could, of course, make voting easier for all concerned by
extending absentee voting privileges to those in appellants’ class. Its failure to do so, however,
hardly seems arbitrary.”).
285. Id. at 811.
286. Id. (quoting Semler v. Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)).
287. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 n.6 (1969); see also
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 304 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[S]crutiny under this
Clause is triggered only where restrictions have a real and appreciable impact on [the] ability
to exercise the franchise.”); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (“[N]ot every limitation
or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of
review.” (citing McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969))).
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Prigmore v. Renfro, the Supreme Court unanimously summarily
affirmed a three-judge district court ruling holding that a state
may validly allow absentee voting only by certain categories of
voters.288 Relying primarily on McDonald, the district court had
held:
The right to vote is unquestionably basic to a democracy, but the
right to an absentee ballot is not. Historically, the absentee bal-
lot has always been viewed as a privilege, not an absolute right.
It is a purely remedial measure designed to afford absentee
voters the privilege as a matter of convenience, not of right.
[Restrictions on who may cast absentee ballots create] no bar to
the right to vote nor to the right to travel.289
The Court’s application of rational basis scrutiny to laws se-
lectively expanding or protecting voting rights gave Congress
substantial leeway to enact voting reforms under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court
rejected an equal protection challenge to section 4(e) of the VRA,290
which provides that a person who completes the sixth grade in a
school in Puerto Rico that teaches in a language other than English
may not be denied the right to vote based on their inability to speak
English.291 The State of New York required people to be able to read
and write English in order to vote.292
The Court recognized that Congress enacted section 4(e) of the
VRA “to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New
288. 410 U.S. 919 (1973), aff’g 356 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (three-judge court).
289. Prigmore v. Renfro, 356 F. Supp. 427, 432 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (three-judge court) (cita-
tions omitted). Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2004), is a more recent variation of
Prigmore. The plaintiffs were “working mothers who contend[ed] that because it [wa]s a hard-
ship for them to vote in person on election day, the U.S. Constitution require[d] Illinois to
allow them to vote by absentee ballot.” Id. at 1129. Although Illinois recognized several cate-
gories of voters eligible to cast absentee ballots, the plaintiffs did not fall within any of them.
Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the availability of absentee voting “is quintessentially a
legislative judgment with which ... judges should not interfere unless strongly convinced that
the legislative judgment is grossly awry.” Id. at 1131. Illinois was entitled to draw the balance
that it did “between concern with fraud and concern with turnout by allowing only certain
classes of voter to cast an absentee ballot.” Id.
290. 384 U.S. 641, 643, 646-47 (1966).
291. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e) (Supp. III 2016)).
292. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 643-45.
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York nondiscriminatory treatment by government” concerning vot-
ing rights.293 After ruling that the statute was a valid exercise of
Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,294 the Court went on to hold that it did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.295 It recognized that section 4(e) protected
voting rights for Spanish speakers educated in Puerto Rican schools,
but not Spanish speakers educated elsewhere, illiterates born in the
United States, or anyone else unable to satisfy New York’s English-
language requirements.296 It held that the statute’s classification
was subject only to rational basis scrutiny, however, because rather
than “restrict[ing] or deny[ing] the franchise[,] ... [it] extends the
franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state
law.”297
The Court elaborated that section 4(e) would have been subject to
strict scrutiny only if it “den[ied] fundamental rights.”298 It easily
upheld section 4(e) under rational basis scrutiny, despite the stat-
ute’s limited scope. The Court reasoned:
[A] statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it
might have gone farther than it did .... [A] legislature need not
strike at all evils at the same time, and ... reform may take one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative mind.299
Katzenbach’s holding is remarkable in ways that are often over-
looked. In an effort to combat discrimination concerning the right to
vote, Congress enacted a statute that expressly discriminated with
regard to the right to vote. The fact that the law was written in
terms of extending voting rights to a certain favored constituency,
rather than limiting them for a disfavored constituency, is of limited
293. Id. at 652.
294. Id. at 651.
295. Id. at 652, 658.
296. See id. at 654-56.
297. Id. at 657.
298. Id.
299. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337,
339 (1929); then quoting Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935);
and then quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).
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functional relevance. Either way, a statutory classification results
in differential voting rights for members of the affected electorate.
Thus, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence concerning vot-
ing rights has historically been two-pronged: laws restricting the
right to vote for certain people were subject to strict scrutiny, while
laws expanding or protecting the right to vote only for certain people
were subject to rational basis scrutiny. This structure embodies a
pro-voting bias: laws seen as expanding the franchise were gener-
ally upheld, while laws restricting it were generally invalidated.
This interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is both un-
stable and dangerous. Unstable, because there is no firm baseline
distinguishing laws restricting the franchise from laws expanding
it. The same statutory scheme could be enacted either as a broad
restriction on voting, with exceptions facilitating voting by certain
groups (which presumably would be reviewed under a rational basis
standard) or a general authorization of voting with exceptions pro-
hibiting voting by certain groups (which presumably would be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny). Moreover, whether a law is framed as
a restriction on voting or a liberalization of voting, the categories it
creates separate those who are permitted to vote from those pro-
hibited from doing so. There is no convincing rationale for subjecting
some laws conferring disparate Voter Eligibility Rights or Voter
Participation Rights to rational basis scrutiny, and others to strict
scrutiny.
Perhaps most importantly, rational basis scrutiny for purported-
ly pro-voting provisions yields unavoidable opportunities for politi-
cal manipulation. A political party in power may easily craft reasons
why constituencies favorable to it deserve special consideration in
registering to vote or voting, giving it a structural advantage in the
electoral process. The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Griffin v. Roupas
shows one consequence of this pro-voting, rational-basis approach.300
The court upheld Illinois’s selective absentee voting statute, which
permitted only certain categories of people to cast absentee bal-
lots.301 Absentee voting has become an increasingly critical aspect
of the electoral process; in 2016, nearly a quarter of the ballots in
300. 385 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2004).
301. See id. at 1129.
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the presidential election were cast absentee via mail.302 The power
to allow certain groups of people to vote absentee is almost as sig-
nificant as the ability to define the scope of the electorate. While the
plaintiffs in Griffin did not allege or prove any particular partisan
or other invidious intent, the potential for manipulation is unavoid-
able.
If voting is recognized as a fundamental right under the Equal
Protection Clause, then not only should people’s votes be weighted
equally,303 but also their opportunities to vote should be equal with-
in an electoral jurisdiction as well. When a state’s legislature enacts
laws governing the electoral process, it should generally treat voters
across the state equally. To the extent such power is devolved on
county election officials, they should presumptively treat voters
within each county equally. A state typically should not be permit-
ted to give certain favored classes of voters additional protection for
their right to vote, whether by establishing alternate means of
voting for them (such as absentee ballots), granting them additional
time, exempting them from certain requirements, or otherwise.
Special voting opportunities may be made selectively available to
certain people only when they face restrictions or burdens directly
created by the government itself, such as military voters protected
by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act304 and
the Uniform Military and Overseas Voters Act.305
Perhaps the most obvious objection to such an interpretation is
that it would hinder efforts to help elderly and disabled voters.306
Such laws may be underinclusive, however, as people who do not
qualify as elderly or disabled may face comparable hardships or ob-
stacles in voting. Moreover, some supposedly ameliorative measures
raise a substantial risk that mentally fragile or elderly voters may
be exploited by supposed “helpers” who provide “assistance” in vot-
ing and, in some cases, transport physically incapacitated voters’
absentee ballots back to election officials. Finally, and perhaps most
302. See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, THE ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING
SURVEY: 2016 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 10 (2017).
303. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
304. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat.
924 (1986) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20311 (Supp. III 2016)).
305. UNIF. MILITARY & OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT (UMOVA), 13 pt. 2 U.L.A. 141 (Supp. 2017).
306. See, e.g., Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 98-435,
98 Stat. 1678 (1984) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20107 (Supp. III 2016)).
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importantly, once the government singles out certain groups such
as the elderly or disabled as particularly deserving of special con-
sideration in the voting process, it becomes easier for legislatures
and election officials to facilitate voting by other favored constituen-
cies and supporters.
C. The New Equal Protection: Equal Protection as a Strict
Equality, Strict Scrutiny Norm
Recent equal protection cases concerning voting rights suggest
an abandonment of this pro-voting, rational basis approach.307
Courts seem to be applying the Equal Protection Clause differently:
because voting is a fundamental right, distinctions among voters
are subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of whether the underlying
measure may be characterized as expanding or limiting the fran-
chise. Bush v. Gore supports this reinterpretation of equal protec-
tion voting rights.308 The Court began by declaring that states must
accord “equal weight ... to each vote and ... equal dignity ... to each
voter.”309 It went on to state that equal protection principles apply
to both the “allocation of the franchise ... [and] the manner of its
exercise.”310 By treating voting as a fundamental right that must be
administered equally for all votes, the Court seems to be signaling
an expansion of strict scrutiny.
The holding of Bush v. Gore confirms this interpretation. The
Court held the Equal Protection Clause prohibited recount boards
in different counties, as well as election officials within the same
room, from applying different standards in determining whether a
ballot qualified as a valid vote, even though the ongoing recount
process would have resulted in at least some additional ballots being
counted that would otherwise have been discarded.311 The Court
attempted to limit its holding “to the present circumstances,”
307. But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting
Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2873-74 (2014) (questioning whether such
retrenchment has occurred).
308. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
309. Id. at 104.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 109-10; see also id. at 106 (“[T]he standards for accepting or rejecting
contested ballots might vary not only from county to county but indeed within a single county
from one recount team to another.”).
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emphasizing that “the problem of equal protection in election pro-
cesses generally presents many complexities.”312 Bush v. Gore nev-
ertheless marked a pivotal moment in the development of election
law, however, and its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
could not be confined.313
The Sixth Circuit—home of Ohio, the perennial presidential bat-
tleground state—has been the epicenter of the evolution of equal
protection law governing voting rights from a pro-voting, rational
basis standard to a more comprehensive, strict scrutiny, fundamen-
tal rights paradigm.314 In the 2008 case League of Women Voters of
Ohio v. Brunner, the Sixth Circuit quoted extensively from Bush v.
Gore to hold that the plaintiffs had stated a valid claim that Wis-
consin’s 2004 elections violated the Equal Protection Clause.315 The
court pointed to disparities in waiting times among polling loca-
tions, differences in the percentages of provisional ballots counted,
and other related factors.316
The Sixth Circuit took this approach even further in Obama for
America v. Husted.317 As a result of a series of legislative changes,
the Ohio Election Code ended in-person early voting for the gen-
eral public on the Friday before Election Day, but allowed military
voters to continue casting ballots in person through Election Day
itself.318 Under the McDonald-Katzenbach standard, such a scheme
should have easily been upheld. The state’s decision to grant ex-
tra opportunities for early voting to military voters should have
312. Id. at 109.
313. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS 134 (2012).
314. See also Hussey v. City of Portland, 64 F.3d 1260, 1262, 1266 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to a local law requiring any homeowners living outside a municipality’s bound-
aries to vote in favor of annexation as a condition of receiving a subsidy for compulsory sewer
connections); One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 946-48 (W.D. Wis. 2016)
(holding that a state law prohibiting “municipal clerks from faxing or emailing absentee
ballots, except to military or overseas electors ... violates the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments”), argued, Nos. 16-3083 & 16-3091 (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2017).
315. 548 F.3d 463, 476-77 (6th Cir. 2008).
316. Id. at 467-69.
317. 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012). The author represented a coalition of military and vet-
erans groups that intervened in this case to defend the constitutionality of the challenged
statute.
318. Id. at 425.
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triggered only rational basis scrutiny because the state was mak-
ing it easier for them to vote.319
The Sixth Circuit, however, held that this statutory scheme vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.320 During the previous election
cycle, the court pointed out, one hundred thousand voters—includ-
ing many poor, female, elderly, and minority voters—had chosen to
cast their votes over the weekend before Election Day.321 Based on
their decision to vote at that time during a previous election, the
court hypothesized that they would decline to vote at any other
time.322 In other words, the court assumed that, were the state to
prevent those voters from voting over the weekend before Election
Day, they would not cast an absentee ballot, vote at some other
point during the month-long early voting period, or vote on Election
Day.323 The court elevated voter choice and convenience into a
matter of fundamental right.324
Obama for America makes it difficult for the federal government
or states to extend special voting opportunities to, or otherwise act
to protect the voting rights of, only certain populations. Its reason-
ing harkens back to Harper and Kramer, which had applied strict
scrutiny to statutory classifications concerning voting rights. The
Court disregarded Katzenbach’s admonition that a legislature need
not tackle every aspect of a problem simultaneously when it seeks
to expand voting opportunities.325 Emphasizing the need for equali-
ty among voters, Obama for America concluded that the state had
violated the Equal Protection Clause by creating special opportuni-
ties for members of the military to vote in person without extending
them to other members of the general public who were purportedly
“similarly situated” with regard to in-person voting.326
319. See supra Part III.B.3.
320. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 436.
321. Id. at 431.
322. Id.
323. See id. at 427, 431.
324. See id. at 429-31; cf. id. at 440 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[T]hough the record clearly establishes that a significant number of Ohio voters found it
most convenient to vote after hours and the weekend before the election, the study did not
consider the extent to which these voters would or could avail themselves of other voting
options .... Convenience cannot be equated with necessity without more.”).
325. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966).
326. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 435.
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Obama for America’s application of Bush v. Gore’s treatment of
voting as a fundamental right portends potentially substantial
restrictions on the practical scope of Congress’s power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Requiring equal treatment a-
mong voters concerning Voter Eligibility Rights, Voter Participa-
tion Rights, and Voter Equality Rights limits Congress’s ability to
create special protections for certain members of the electorate.
Congress may no longer single out particular voters, such as mem-
bers of racial minority groups, for special prophylactic protection of
their voting rights beyond what the Constitution itself requires.
Section 2 of the VRA, in particular, goes beyond the requirements
of the Equal Protection Clause by granting special protections to
members of racial minority groups who choose to engage in racial
bloc voting.327 Even putting aside potential concerns over the stat-
ute’s race consciousness, protecting only certain voters’ ability to
elect the candidate of their choice raises serious questions from the
perspective of voting as a fundamental right.
At root, the decision between equal protection as a pro-voting
norm triggering rational basis enforcement and equal protection as
a voter equality norm triggering strict scrutiny is an institutional
choice question. If rational basis scrutiny is applied, Congress
may exercise broad authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce voting rights, but such reduced scrutiny
greatly curtails the power of courts to invalidate differential treat-
ment of voters. Conversely, if strict scrutiny is applied, courts may
vigorously ensure equal treatment of voters, but that inherently
limits Congress’s authority to grant protections to certain groups
on a piecemeal basis.
Congress was originally entrusted with responsibility for enfor-
cing voting rights under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.328
It failed.329 Rulings such as Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona In-
dependent Redistricting Commission330 suggest that the modern
Court is reluctant to entrust the political branches with control over
327. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (Supp. III 2016)); see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50
& n.16 (1986).
328. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
329. See Morley, supra note 55, at 324-29. 
330. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2015).
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the electoral process and voting rights—even when the plain text of
the Constitution expressly grants it to them.331 The political ger-
rymandering case presently before the Court gives it yet another
opportunity to promote judicial oversight over the electoral process
and curtail the political branches’ discretion.332 From an institu-
tional choice perspective, the less courts trust the political branches
to regulate the electoral process, the more equality among voters
courts will mandate as a matter of constitutional interpretation. To
the extent the Equal Protection Clause limits congressional author-
ity to selectively protect the right to vote or requires that measures
such as section 2 of the VRA be construed more narrowly, it may
more than compensate by enabling greater judicial protection for
all voters.
CONCLUSION
The Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to reg-
ulate elections at all levels of government while simultaneously
limiting that authority in a variety of ways. Scholars have focused,
for the most part, on the impact of Boerne’s “congruence and pro-
portionality” test on the scope of Congress’s authority to enact vot-
ing rights legislation, such as the VRA.333 Far less attention has
been paid to evolving equal protection norms.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court construed the Equal Protection
Clause in a pro-voting light, subjecting statutes that extend or
protect voting rights for certain groups to only rational basis scru-
tiny and generally upholding them.334 More recent jurisprudence
suggests courts may be shifting to a voting-as-a-fundamental-right
paradigm under the Equal Protection Clause.335 From this perspec-
tive, laws that single out certain groups to receive additional op-
portunities to vote or protection for their voting rights are generally
subject to strict scrutiny. While this new equal protection paradigm
facilitates greater judicial enforcement of voter equality, it can
331. Morley, supra note 207, at 90-91.
332. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued,
No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
333. See, e.g., supra notes 146-65 and accompanying text. 
334. See supra Part III.B.3.
335. See supra Part III.C.
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substantially constrain Congress’s ability to enact special protec-
tions for disadvantaged groups.
To help preserve section 2 of the VRA against possible constitu-
tional challenges, voting rights advocates can press for reasonable
reinterpretations of the law. Rather than institutionalizing and
helping to perpetuate racial balkanization or polarization in voting,
redistricting challenges should be levied where a likelihood of inten-
tional racial discrimination exists. Courts should avoid treating
section 2 of the VRA as a ratchet, akin to section 5, that prevents
states from amending or eliminating voting reforms, such as ex-
tended early voting periods, simply because certain segments of the
electorate chose to take advantage of them. Courts should also be re-
luctant to find statutory (or constitutional) violations simply be-
cause voters are unable to take advantage of their preferred method
or procedure for voting when other alternatives are reasonably
available.
More broadly, to survive constitutional scrutiny from a conserva-
tive Court, section 2—as a prophylactic statute—should be con-
strued and applied in light of the traditional remedial principles
courts rely upon in the context of prophylactic injunctions. Courts
may apply section 2 more aggressively to defendant jurisdictions
or officials that have a recent history of engaging in intentional
racial discrimination concerning the right to vote. They should also
be more willing to allow prophylactic applications of section 2 in
circumstances where direct evidence of constitutional violations
(that is, intentional discrimination) would be impracticable or im-
possible to uncover. Finally, remedies under section 2 should not be
broader than necessary to achieve its important prophylactic pur-
poses. Section 2 runs a risk: the more it deviates from the mandates
of the Court’s developing conception of equal protection, and does so
in a race-conscious manner that almost invariably inures to the
benefit of a particular political party, the greater skepticism it will
trigger in the courts. It places courts in the difficult position of re-
shaping both the rules of elections and the shape of electoral dis-
tricts to attempt to replicate what a fair electoral outcome in the
absence of past and present societal discrimination would look like.
Such awesome power demands careful use.
